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College in the United States is very expensive. This statement has been true for
at least a generation, but costs have reached new heights in recent years. List tuition
prices have grown at a rate of about 5% above inflation over the last ten years, and
the financial aid budgets of both the US government and individual institutions are
expanding to keep up.1 The studies presented in this dissertation tackle some of the
finance-related questions that arise in discussions of the higher education market in
the United States. We examine college funding and affordability, aid policies, and
college choice. This work may help to inform governments, institutions, families, and
students about the risks and rewards of higher education.
In chapter II, we examine the role of public and private funding for higher educa-
tion in countries throughout North America and Western Europe. We compare and
contrast the various systems of higher education funding that are found in wealthy
Western nations, and examine the impact of recent reforms meant to overhaul some
of these systems. We focus on drivers of overall enrollment in higher education, and
study the impact of spending, social inequality, and GDP. This work provides context
for further study of the US system. In general, the US higher education system relies
more heavily on private funding and financial aid than its European counterparts,
1See e.g. The College Board (2012b) and The College Board (2012c) for more on college pricing
and financial aid trends.
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though recent European reforms tend to move away from traditional publicly funded
systems.
Chapter III focuses on the US higher education market. By developing a two-
stage least squares model of supply and demand in higher eduation, we build a better
understanding of the effect of aid mechanisms on school and student decisions. We
study the effect of financial factors such as tuition and aid amounts, expenditures, and
schools’ revenues on enrollment levels. Additionally, we compile an extensive dataset
of macroeconomic variables that capture changes in the higher education market and
financial aid market over a thirty-year period, and develop supply-side and demand-
side models. A primary motivator for this work is the hypothesis that increased aid
availability may actually be helping to fuel higher tuition prices.
Chapter IV studies the impact of financial factors on higher education at an even
more granular level. A unique individual-level dataset on college choice decisions
allows us to create models of the decision to attend college and the choice between
institutions. We study the relationship between post-college income, individual and
school characteristics, and the student side of the college decision process. We ex-
amine drivers of income differences across students after adjusting for ability. This
work introduces a new method of adjusting for bias introduced through differences
in student ability across schooling decisions. Unique survey data that captures all
stages of students’ application processes allows us to condition on the selectivity level
of the top school to which a student was admitted, capturing valuable information
about that students’ intrinsic ability. We focus on the effect of student and family
charateristics as well as school and major decisions made by individual students after
adjusting for ability. This chapter also outlines important areas of future research
that will enhance understanding of the relationship between educational decisions
and future income levels.
2
CHAPTER II
For what it’s worth: Higher education spending in
North America and Western Europe
2.1 Introduction
Developed Western countries have taken very different approaches to financing
higher education. On one extreme, students attending private four-year colleges and
universities in the United States now pay an average of $36,993 per year to attend
school (College Board Advocacy and Policy Center, 2010). On the other hand, Euro-
pean students in Finland, Norway, Austria, and other countries pay no official tuition,
though fees and housing costs may apply (EDALO Education Promotional Services
S.L., 2011). Some governments have instituted complicated financial aid systems
throug which federal, state, and local governments can assist students, while other
countries rely on private lenders. There is an extensive literature examining the simi-
larities and differences, failures and successes of these different approaches to tertiary
education. Overall, universities in North America and Western Europe provide some
of the best education in the world, but experts and the media have warned in recent
years that Western educational institutions may be losing ground (see e.g. Economist
(2010) and Harris and Beschloss (2011)). In order for universities to remain compet-
itive, affordable, and well-funded, governments must maximize the impact of aid and
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subsidies.
This chapter examines differential effects of GDP, population, and tertiary educa-
tion spending on enrollment across North America and Western Europe. Our goals
are to study the effect of public versus private spending on enrollment, to identify
economic drivers of enrollment, and to examine differences in enrollment levels caused
by the introduction of certain reforms. New enrollment captures the initial decision
to attend school and gives an indication of access to tertiary education. Improved
access to higher education is a common goal for policymakers. The strongest predic-
tor of new enrollment in tertiary education is GDP in the country in question, not
spending on tertiary education alone. We find a positive relationship between GDP
and enrollment. Although this primarily captures the fact that larger countries have
greater enrollment, we investigate differences in enrollment based on the enactment
of reforms and public to private spending ratios.
We find that the effect of GDP on enrollment varies between countries with dif-
ferent levels of private spending and tuition. Specifically, for the same GDP levels,
enrollment is higher in countries with a high level of private spending on tertiary edu-
cation. This may indicate that better economic conditions have a more positive effect
in these countries. This result may also stem from the fact that private spending on
education is more highly correlated with GDP than public spending, indicating that
GDP increases raise enrollment both directly and indirectly through higher private
spending levels. We find no significant differences in baseline enrollment or effect of
GDP over time. We also do not see an effect of education and funding reforms.
2.2 Background
A rise in earnings inequality in the 20th century brought renewed relevance to the
question of return on investment in higher education. During this time, influential
papers like Becker and Chiswick (1966) and Mincer (1974) first applied sophisticated
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human capital models to the question of returns on education. Those papers set
the stage for future returns estimates based on ordinary least squares regression,
various instrumental variables approaches, semi-log earnings functions, and natural
experiments based on twin data and policy changes (see e.g. Psacharopoulos and
Mattson (1998), Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999), Heinrich and Hildebrand (2005),
and Hämäläinen and Uusitalo (2008)). Private returns are calculated based on out-
of-pocket education costs and after-tax earnings differences between those with a
tertiary degree and those without. Social returns are based on public expenditures
and productivity differentials. In general, private returns exceed social returns, and
higher levels of economic development and previous education reduce the impact of
further education (see Psacharopoulos (1972)).
In this study, we focus on highly developed economies in Europe and North Amer-
ica. According to Psacharopoulos (1972), the richest countries in these regions have
among the lowest returns on education in the world. Returns are higher in East-
ern European countries like the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, but are still
below international average returns. Returns on education in these areas are fairly
consistent over time, even in countries of the former Eastern Bloc that have recently
transitioned to market economies (see Flabbi et al. (2011)). Each country strikes a
different balance between public and private funding of tertiary education. In the
United States, close to 40% of the contribution to tertiary education comes from
households. In much of Europe, this number is well below 10% (OECD, 1998). In
the last several years, many European countries have struggled to reduce government
spending, and educational expenditures are a popular place for cuts. Costs can be
shared among governments and taxpayers, students and their families, and philan-
thropic organizations. Mechanisms for such cost-sharing include public and private
grants, student tuition and fees, government sponsorship of schools (tuition-free edu-
cation), government subsidies for schools, government subsidies for students including
5
subsidized loans, indirect government support such as child allowances, and tax cred-
its (for more on these see Johnstone (2005)). This work does not seek to create a new
estimate of returns on investment in tertiary education. Instead, we investigate dif-
ferences in the effect of educational spending and GDP on new enrollment in tertiary
education.
2.3 Data
Lack of consistent, reliable data is a primary barrier to research on higher edu-
cation spending. It is difficult to get relevant spending and earnings data in each
country, and reporting differences between countries make it hard to compare re-
sults. Additionally, a large number of control variables must be accounted for, such
as differences in age, intelligence, motivation, and other personal information (see
e.g. Psacharopoulos (1972)). Past estimates of returns of higher education use data
reported by individual governments, international groups like the European Union,
UNESCO, or OECD, and individual survey results from studies like the European
Community Household Panel (see, for example, Heinrich and Hildebrand (2005)).
For this work, we use data from the OECD, UNESCO, and Eurostat to build a
panel dataset of enrollment, population, GDP, and expenditures. We also include
a variety of adjustment variables which allow us to conduct analysis on a per stu-
dent basis. These results are not provided here but support conclusions similar to
those from the aggregate analysis that is presented. This dataset is supplemented
with information about recent tertiary education reforms in Europe from a variety of
sources, including Centro de Estudios en Gestión de la Educación Superior (2007),
CHELPS, IOE London, Technopolis Group (2010), Johnstone (2005), OECD (1998),
EDALO Education Promotional Services S.L. (2011), and ICHEFAP (2011). The
dataset spans an eleven-year period from 1997 to 2008 and includes twelve countries,
as shown in table 2.1. We consider new enrollment in tertiary education, graduation
6













rates, unemployment rates, and relative earnings of tertiary graduates versus non-
graduates as metrics of educational success in each country. Only the new enrollment
metric yields significant results, probably since relative earnings and graduation rates
depend increasingly on the actual quality of education received. On the spending
side, we examine GDP, total expenditures on tertiary institutions, public expendi-
tures on tertiary institutions, a ratio of public over total spending, and population as
candidate predictors. As described in the next section, we employ a fixed effects ap-
proach to account for country differences, allowing us to limit the number of predictor
variables in the model. A list of main variables used is provided in table 2.2.
2.4 Model
We use simple ordinary least squares regression to model the relationship be-
tween spending metrics and outcomes. The panel data compiled for this study are
non-stationary as determined by inspection and unit root tests.1 We therefore take
1Fail to reject presence of unit roots in time series for new enrollment (p-value = 0.99 at lag 1).
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Table 2.2: Summary of data and sources.
Category Summary Data source
Outcome metrics
New enrollment New entrants into tertiary
(college-level, non-professional,
ISCED 5Aa) education, per
population
OECD (2011)
Graduation rate Graduates per enrollment in ter-
tiary (ISCED 5 & 6) education
OECD (2011)
Employment rate Relative employment rate for
tertiary (ISCED 5 & 6) grad-
uates versus upper secondary
(ISCED 3 & 4) graduates
OECD (2011)
Earnings difference Relative earnings for tertiary
(ISCED 5 & 6) graduates versus
upper secondary (ISCED 3 & 4)
graduates
OECD (2011)
Spending and economic metrics
Total expenditures Expenditure on education insti-
tutions (total, public and private
sources), tertiary (5,6), $BN
OECD (2011)
Public expenditures Expenditure on education insti-
tutions and administration, pub-
lic sources, tertiary, $BN
OECD (2011)
Ratio public/total expenditures Public expenditures/total ex-
penditures
OECD (2011)
GDP Gross domestic product, $BN World Bank (2011)






Enrollment Total enrollment in tertiary edu-
cation (ISCED 5 & 6)
UNESCO (2011)
aISCED is the International Standard Classification of Education developed by UNESCO. For
more information, see UNESCO (2013).
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ordinary differences of all data. Log differences were also considered and yielded sim-
ilar results. The strongest relationship among the spending and outcome variables
described in the previous section exists between GDP and new enrollment in tertiary
education. Graduation rate, employment rate, and earnings difference are metrics of
educational success rather than simply attendance. There may be too many other
factors affecting quality of education to allow us to identify the relationship between
these variables and per student spending. We therefore use only GDP and new en-
rollment for our analysis. Table 2.3 shows the simplest possible model demonstrating
the relationship between GDP and new enrollment. We see that a $1 million increase
in GDP leads to an enrollment increase of 0.19 students. This relationship captures
primarily the fact that larger economies enroll more students in tertiary education.
We use this as a baseline to compare differences not explained by country size.
Table 2.3: Effect of GDP on new higher education enrollment. newEnrollmenti,t =
β0 + β1GDPi,t + εi,t.
a
Ordinary least squares regression
Adjusted R2 0.2757
Variableb Coefficient value St. error p-value
(Intercept) 2,402.52 2,678.64
GDP ($BN) 190.46 26.74 6.47x10−11
aData include yearly GDP and enrollment figures for countries listed in table 2.1 from 1997 to
2008.
bFor detailed variable descriptions see table 2.2.
We investigate many alternative models to the one presented in table 2.3. A similar
model using log-differenced data yields consistent results. Models where all data
are normalized to account for country size (i.e. enrollment is given as a percentage
of population and per capita GDP is used) also provide similar results. We also
experiment with using population and spending on tertiary education instead of GDP.
We find that the portion of these variables directly correlated with GDP provide most
of the predictive power. Results regarding enrollment differences are confirmed. These
models are provided in appendix A.1.
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We use the model given in table 2.3 to test for differences between countries. We
introduce country and time fixed effects in order to reduce possible omitted variable
bias. Time fixed effects account for unobserved shifters of enrollment that change over
time and affect all countries. Country fixed effects account for unobserved shifters
of enrollment that may affect a particular country but are constant over time. We
find no significant time fixed effects. However, we do see that, for the same GDP
levels, enrollment is higher in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Poland,
as shown in table 2.4. Investigating the causes of this difference is beyond the scope
of this chapter, but we suggest it may be due to a larger private return on education;
these countries have higher levels of social inequality than other countries studied,
as shown in figure 2.1. This figure plots Gini coefficients for the countries in our
sample. Gini coefficients measure social inequality, with a larger index suggesting
greater inequality.2 Figure 2.2 plots country fixed effects from the model in table 2.4
for each country against the corresponding Gini coefficient, showing a strong trend
of greater enrollment for the same GDP level as Gini coefficient increases. Countries
with higher Gini coefficients and higher enrollment relative to GDP also have a higher
ratio of private to total spending, implying that more education funding comes from
tuition than in other countries.
We can study the effect of private versus public spending by categorizing coun-
tries according to their private to total spending ratios. Table 2.5 shows this model,
revealing higher enrollment levels for countries with higher private to total spending
ratios when GDP and total spending are held constant. A possible explanation for
this phenomenon is that GDP growth may translate more directly into more educa-
tion spending in countries with high private spending. Private individuals can choose
to take on loans or grants for educational purposes in response to a growing economy
more quickly than governments can increase spending. Additionally, GDP growth is
2Gini coefficient data compiled from Central Intelligence Agency (2011).
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Figure 2.1: Gini coefficient by country.a
aGini coefficient data compiled from Central Intelligence Agency (2011). Gini coefficient measures
social inequality, with a larger index suggesting greater inequality.
more highly correlated with private spending on education than public spending, so
increases in GDP raise enrollment levels directly as well as through higher private
spending levels.
Table 2.4: Effect of GDP on new enrollment, including country fixed effects.




Variablec Coefficient value St. error p-value
GDP -2,157.66 42.19 2.87x10−4
Poland 15,400.86 6,609.50 0.02
United Kingdom 18,483.89 6,958.13 8.98x10−3
United States 138,237.45 14,327.32 2.00x10−16
aOnly coefficients significantly different from zero are presented.
bData include yearly GDP and enrollment figures for countries listed in table 2.1 from 1997 to
2008.
cFor detailed variable descriptions see table 2.2.
We further investigate interaction effects between country dummies as well as
ratio categories and GDP. These interaction effects test for differences in the effect
of GDP changes across countries or different private to total spending ratios. The
interaction terms in the regression equation allow the impact of GDP on enrollment
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Figure 2.2: Country fixed effect versus Gini coefficient.a,b,c
aGini coefficient data compiled from Central Intelligence Agency (2011). Gini coefficient measures
social inequality, with a larger index suggesting greater inequality.
bFit line equation given by giniCoefficient = 0.0001 ∗ countryDummyi + 28.193.
cCountries plotted are those listed in table 2.1.
Table 2.5: Effect of GDP on new enrollment, including fixed effects for public/total




Variableb Coefficient value St. error p-value
GDP ($BN) 74.01 37.36 0.05
Public/total spending < 0.6 (high relative tuition) 45,881.63 10,759.5 3.86x10−5
aSpending ratio is calculated as public educational spending/total educational spending for each
country. Fixed effects are estimated for each ratio category. Categories are those countries with a
ratio > 0.9 (low relative tuition), countries with a ratio between 0.6 and 0.9 (medium tuition), and
countries with a ratio < 0.6 (high relative tuition). Only coefficients significantly different from zero
are presented. Data include yearly GDP, enrollment, and spending figures for countries listed in
table 2.1 from 1997 to 2008.
bFor detailed variable descriptions see table 2.2.
(i.e. the slope of the regression line) to vary between countries or ratio categories, as
shown in equation (2.1).
newEnrollmenti,t = β0 + β1GDPi,t + γi(countryDummyi ∗GDPi,t) + εi,t (2.1)
where β0 is the intercept, β1 is the coefficient of GDP, γi is the estimated country
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fixed effect for country i, and εi,t is a white noise error term. We find no significant
interaction terms for the regression of enrollment on GDP. This suggests that GDP
changes have a similar effect across countries.
We also look for evidence of regression discontinuity caused by recent reforms in
European countries. In the past few decades, countries like Austria, Finland, and
Hungary have eliminated or severely reduced tuition. Others, like Portugal and the
United Kingdom, have introduced or increased tuition and fees. Still others have
handed university administration over to non-government bodies for the first time,
increasing institutional autonomy. Poland and Hungary, among others, introduced
student loan and grant systems to help families pay for increasingly expensive tertiary
education. For the current analysis, reforms are categorized according to a taxonomy
suggested by ICHEFAP (2011), as seen in table 2.6. We test for differences in the
effect of GDP on enrollment before and after reforms in several of these categories,
including increased school autonomy, more government oversight of higher education,
tuition bans, changes to loan programs, and changes to grant programs. We find
no significant differences in the effect of GDP on enrollment based on these reform
categories.
2.5 Conclusion
Our results indicate that GDP growth increases enrollment, with GDP being the
main driver of enrollment changes. Although this result may simply demonstrate
that larger countries have higher enrollment in tertiary education, the differences
between countries provide interesting insights. Enrollment is higher for the same GDP
and spending levels in countries where private spending contributes significantly to
education. This may be because rising GDP levels in these countries fuel enrollment
both directly and by improving families’ ability to afford higher education. We find
no significant differences in the effects of GDP based on recent European higher
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Table 2.6: Reform categories: Higher education reform in Europe.
Reform category Specific reform Countries where reforms im-
plemented
Cost sharing Introduction of tuition or significant
fees
Austria, Finland, Hungary, Italy,
Poland, United Kingdom
Tuition or significant fees banned Austria, Finland, Hungary, Ire-
land
Introduction of a second pay-track for
non-government supported students
Hungary
Tuition increase United Kingdom
Increase in the amount of money re-
ceived from governments, or how it is
allocated
Austria, Ireland, Italy, Spain
Autonomy Increase in university autonomy Austria, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom
Financial aid Loans introduced or expanded Austria, Hungary, Netherlands,
Poland, United Kingdom
Grants introduced or expanded Austria, Hungary, Poland
Introduction of loan limits United States
education reforms, suggesting that these reforms have not had a significant impact on
the effectiveness of subsidies to education, at least in terms of attendance and access.
This is an important result for policymakers as they strive to improve access to higher
education. Future work should seek to confirm the existence of enrollment differences
based on public versus private spending differentials. A more complete dataset over a
longer period of time would be required. Additionally, future research should attempt
to adjust for the effects of significant shifts in the demographics of many Western
European nations. An ageing population and changes in ethnic composition due to




The credits that count: The effect of credit growth
and financial aid on college tuition and fees
3.1 Introduction
Fifty-eight percent of US college students take out loans to help pay for tuition and
fees. According to The Wall Street Journal, their average debt load upon graduation
is $23,186 and rising (Chaker, 2009). This comes as no surprise; college tuition prices
increased by a staggering 326% between 1987 and 2007 (5.8% annually). To provide
some comparison, the rise in medical costs during the same period was just 186%
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). Rising tuition rates make it more and more
difficult for families to pay for a college education. Student loans contribute to high
levels of both personal and public debt, which are exacerbated by high tuition prices
and easy credit from government student loan programs, respectively. These trends
may be unsustainable.
Rising tuition rates have become a popular topic in the media and a priority for
policymakers. Federal and state governments try to improve access to higher ed-
ucation for Americans through expanding financial aid programs. These programs
allow thousands of Americans to attend school, but prices continue to rise, prompting
governments to offer more and more financial aid. As early as 1987, Secretary of Edu-
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cation William Bennett, Jr. suggested that readily available student loans and grants
may actually be fueling the increase in tuition prices (Bennett, 1987). The current
economic environment has infused renewed relevance into investigating a revised ver-
sion of the “Bennett Hypothesis”: If public funding artificially inflates prices, they
may eventually collapse, forcing schools to close, shattering perceptions of the worth
of higher education, and destabilizing the education lending system through tighter
lending standards and higher interest rates. In the meantime, prices may become too
high for many Americans to afford without plunging into debt. Additionally, there is
growing concern that US institutions may be losing ground in relation to international
peers (see e.g. Harris and Beschloss (2011)), and that top tier elite institutions no
longer carry their former prestige and value (see e.g. Kim et al. (2009)). Increasingly
easy access to educational materials and skilled labor around the world is rapidly
changing the US higher education market, creating uncertainty about the feasibility
of high tuition prices in the future.
The main objective of this work is to conduct a macro-level analysis of the factors
affecting supply and demand of higher education. By creating a single picture of sup-
ply and demand dynamics, we provide a context for previous research that studies
the importance of individual shifters of supply and demand. We confirm that tuition,
financial aid, and credit have a significant effect on US higher education supply and
demand and build a better understanding of their directional impact within a holistic
model. We use a two-stage least squares regression with a first order autoregressive
error term to estimate supply and demand models for undergraduate education. Sup-
ply and demand are measured by enrollment quantity (undergraduate enrollment per
high school graduate). We find that the benefit of a college education, household debt,
and student loans shift demand, while cost of operations for schools, government aid
to schools, and tuition and non-tuition revenue affect supply. Our model supports
the theory that schools benefit from spending more on their students and increasing
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tuition prices. However, our results indicate that credit constraints are a concern for
students and their families, driving down demand and possibly limiting the ability of
schools to continue on their trend of improving facilities, better services, and higher
costs. Tuition and debt are highly correlated, suggesting that people use loan aid to
cover greater schooling costs.
3.2 Literature review
A primary challenge in postsecondary education research is the availability of data.
In the US, the federal government is the main data provider, and maintains sources
of both aggregate and individual student data over time. Federal aggregate data
are compiled in the Digest of Education Statistics and the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System, while individual student data are provided through a series
of longitudinal surveys (National Center for Education Statistics, 2008, 2009). Several
private institutions such as US News & World Report and The College Board also
keep data on rankings, tuition price, financial aid, and student bodies.
A second major challenge in this field is that the benefits of education are difficult
to quantify. There are signs that the benefit of college has begun to decline in recent
years, with more people with bachelor’s degrees finding it difficult to secure employ-
ment in a field that takes advantage of their qualifications. For example, according
to The Chronicle of Higher Education, 13% of parking lot attendants currently hold
bachelor’s degrees or higher (Vedder, 2010). However, recent return-on-investment
studies (see e.g. Heckman et al. (2008)) claim that returns on a college education are
steady or even increasing. These studies do not fully account for inherent differences
between those that attend college and those that do not, or adjust for the possibility
that college is unfordable for some. The benefit of college varies widely with the
quality of school attended, and depends on each student’s individual goals, financial
situation, and location. Dale and Krueger (1999) show that the best predictor of a
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college education’s worth is tuition charged at a particular university, with a more
expensive education consistently yielding better pay, even after adjusting for the dif-
fering quality of student bodies at various institutions. However, a more recent study
by Dale and Krueger (2011) shows that controlling for inherent student ability based
on SAT scores almost eliminates the wage increase effect. Higher tuition price may
also lead to increased public perception of prestige, especially at elite schools (John,
1992). Hsing and Chang (1996) show that college enrollment has become more and
more sensitive to tuition and related costs, with enrollment falling as costs increase.
All else being equal, higher tuition prices for the same education reduce the net value
of a college education. There may also be significant peripheral benefits to educa-
tion that allow educated people to participate more effectively in consumer markets.
For example, Grinblatt et al. (2009) show that education and intelligence may im-
prove performance in mutual fund markets. Education may also have a signaling
value that goes beyond the improvement to earnings potential actually created by
education itself. Hämäläinen and Uusitalo (2008), for example, use recent reforms in
the Finnish Polytechnic education system to show that there is a signaling effect on
earnings difference between Polytechnic and vocational school graduates. This type
of signaling may allow more prestigious schools to charge more for the same services,
since admission to a top tier school signals ability to employers. In this study, we
use a combination of the factors identified in past literature as a measure of college
education benefit, namely unemployment rate, the earnings difference between college
and high school graduates, expenditures by schools, and disposable income.1
Past research on drivers of demand for higher education provides mixed results.
Campbell and Siegel (1967) study historical demand levels from 1919 to 1964 and
find that enrollment rises with income and falls with tuition prices. Hight (1975)
1Disposable income is included here because it is highly correlated with the other proxies for
benefit of college, meaning its inclusion as an individual variable leads to cross-correlation and
biased estimators in the final model.
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studies the period from 1927 to 1972, uncovering an increasingly complicated de-
mand structure. Hight finds that the divergence in demand for public versus private
education is fueled by tuition gaps and differing effects of income levels. With the
growth of federal, state, and private financial aid programs, demand structures are
becoming even more complicated. Carneiro et al. (2010) use an instrumental variables
approach to estimate the marginal effect of policy changes, including tuition prices,
on demand. They find that the level of effectiveness in encouraging college enrollment
varies greatly with the type of policy change made. It also differs from student to
student, depending on their specific situation and especially their prior probability of
attending college.
Several groups have specifically examined the effect of financial aid and student
loans on demand and/or tuition price. Conclusions on the institutional effect of finan-
cial aid vary. Due to difficulties in data compilation and the large number of possible
factors affecting supply and demand, most studies focus on a particular program, lo-
cality, or event. Long (2004a), for example, looks at the impact of the Georgia HOPE
Scholarship program, and concludes that scholarships are causing schools to increase
tuition and fees for all students. Dynarski (2004) shows that Georgia’s subsidies also
increase college attendance, as do similar programs in other states. In a larger sample
of four-year schools, however, Long (2003) shows that there is no significant relation-
ship between federal tax credits and tuition price. Further, Long (2006) suggests that
aid is not a significant factor in raising tuition prices, and that the link of aid and
tuition must be studied by examining net tuition prices actually paid by students
instead of list prices. We make this adjustment in the current study. Singell and
Stone (2007) evaluate the validity of the “Bennett Hypothesis” with regard to Pell
grants and conclude that these grants do not raise public universities’ in-state tuition.
At private institutions, however, they find that tuition growth parallels Pell grant in-
creases. Curs et al. (2005) conclude that the institutional impact of Pell grants varies
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greatly with school selectivity. Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2004) suggest that schools do
not increase tuition in response to state or federal financial aid to students. However,
they do not examine aid directly to schools.
College supply dynamics are less well studied. A focus on cutting edge research
has allowed America’s universities to rise to the top internationally, but is also tremen-
dously expensive and may be detracting from the teaching that students pay so much
for (Schumpeter, 2010). Peña (2006) finds that rising tuition costs are highly corre-
lated with increased wealth among colleges, at least at four-year private institutions.2
According to Peña, the growing benefits of college and increase in wealth are the
main drivers of tuition increases in recent years. Wealthier families are able to pay
for more expensive schooling, allowing institutions to raise tuition prices without
reducing their applicant pool. If schools compete (and spend) to be top tier, high-
tuition institutions, Americans looking for a decent education at a reasonable price
will have fewer and fewer options. Rankings are, at least in part, driven by spending
levels (U.S. News and World Report, 2012). However, it is not clear that a better
ranking necessarily means students receive a better education. Most schools are non-
profit entities whose prestige increases with spending more, which is problematic for
accessible education pricing.
It is difficult to distinguish cause from effect in this analysis of financial aid and
tuition prices. However, something is clearly driving prices upwards, and student loan
debt levels are causing severe financial problems for many graduates. In 2009, total
student loan debt surpassed total credit card debt in the United States, with close
to $850 billion in outstanding student loan debt (Pilon, 2010). Additionally, default
rates are on the rise. Private for-profit institutions such as the University of Phoenix,
which are quickly gaining market share, post an average 11.6% default rate among
their students (McCluskey, 2010). We cannot say that financial aid causes tuition
2Wealth is measured by endowment values and the gap between tuition revenue and expenditures.
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prices to rise, but it may be that current pricing mechanisms are somehow unbalanced,
leading to higher and higher prices rather than to a more efficient, accessible education
system. A report by the Goldwater Institute finds that the number of administrators
per 100 students at leading US universities has increased by almost 40% since the early
1990s (Greene, 2010). Meanwhile, the number of researchers and teachers has grown
by less than 20%. Increasing government subsidies help universities cover ever larger
administrative costs, reducing schools’ need to increase efficiency. Top tier schools,
such as Yale and MIT, spend more on administration costs per student than many
other schools spend in total. Yale, for example, spends about $60,000 per student on
administration, while the University of North Texas, among the most frugal, spends
under $10,000 per student in total (Greene, 2010). Schools spend vast amounts of
money on professional-grade athletic facilities, sports programs, and clubs, and pay
the most money to tenure-track professors who teach the fewest students (Hacker and
Dreifus, 2010). These professors may be extracting high economic rents.
Instead of studying causal effects of specific reforms or policies, this chapter pro-
vides a comprehensive picture of the supply and demand market designed as a back-
drop for understanding other findings. We are able to use aggregate data for indi-
viduals and schools across the United States to understand the market as a whole.
We consider the whole college and university system, not e.g. private and public
schools separately or competition among colleges. Our results provide support for
many theories developed through study of natural experiments or more restrictive
datasets, supporting the generalizability of these results. We see that consumers de-
sire the most expensive education possible, but are hampered by credit constraints.
Schools can thus use prices as a signal of quality, raising prices. In light of these
higher prices, governments and private lenders offer loans to help student to achieve
their educational goals, possibly allowing schools to raise prices even further. Our
model allows us to build a picture of overall supply and demand dynamics, revealing
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conditions that are exactly right for the existence and perpetuation of such a cycle of
higher prices and higher debt.
3.3 Data collection
Due to the empirical nature of this study, all of our analysis rests on the compi-
lation of a complete and accurate dataset. We compile a dataset of proxy variables
for drivers of higher education supply and demand as well as a metric of quantity
(enrollment). Candidate drivers cover spending, costs, financial aid, and college ben-
efit. We focus on average behavior across four-year post-secondary institutions in the
United States. Data include public, private, for-profit, and non-profit schools during
the period 1976-2007. We select this period based on data availability and because
it is recent enough to support an understanding of the current situation. In order to
account for changes in the overall industry size, most data are reported per student,
allowing for comparisons over the thirty-year period examined. Similarly, we mea-
sure enrollment quantity divided by high school graduates in that year. All analysis
was also conducted without this normalization, modeling the effect of country-wide
spending, cost, aid, and college benefit on total enrollment in number of students.
This model yields similar results and consistent coefficient signs, alleviating concern
that our results are based solely on the chosen normalization.
We define the quantity of both supply and demand as enrollment (in number of
students) per high school graduate. The normalization factor is included here to
account for the growth trend in the college-eligible population over the period under
study. Using these data we construct two separate linear regression models, one for
supply and one for demand. We identify candidate drivers of supply and demand from
past literature and conversations with faculty, parents, students, and administrators.
It is impossible to include every factor that may shift supply and demand in a given
year. However, the goal here is to include main drivers identified in past literature
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and identify internally consistent relationships between them. We focus especially on
drivers related to financial aid and credit. We include those variables that we believe
should have the largest impact as candidate drivers. We then use data availability
to identify viable proxies. Candidate drivers of supply are the cost of operations for
schools, financial aid given directly to schools, non-tuition revenue, and net tuition
price. Candidate drivers of demand are the benefit of a college education, household
financial situation, financial aid directly to students, and tuition price. For a list of
candidate drivers see table 3.1. We separate aid given directly to schools from aid
given through individual students in order to examine whether the mechanisms of aid-
giving plays a role. In order to capture the price actually paid by students and received
by universities, we use a net tuition estimate, defined as the list tuition price minus
institutional aid (aid given directly to students by schools). Most students receive
additional aid from other sources, thus further lowering the price they actually pay.
For consistency between the supply and demand models, however, we include these
adjustments in financial aid variables rather than in the tuition price itself. Additional
financial aid sources provide aid to students, but do not affect institutional revenue.
The candidate drivers of supply capture schools’ expenses as well as revenue from
aid, tuition, and other sources. These are the main financial drivers of colleges’ de-
cisions, representing major cash flows. Non-financial drivers, such as rankings, are
excluded here because they are relative metrics with unclear aggregate interpreta-
tions.3
Candidate demand drivers are designed to capture the factors individuals use
when making decisions about whether and where to attend school, covering both the
desire and the ability to attend. Estimates of the college education benefit capture
the actual value of the education received. Tuition, aid, and credit variables measure
3It is possible that some sort of “ranking inflation” exists, meaning that higher rankings overall
may indirectly affect other metrics. This is not explicitly treated in our model. Relative metrics
could be included in future studies at the individual school level.
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the price paid for an education and the ability to afford it. Of course, many personal
factors, such as preferences regarding location, school size, non-financial career goals,
and comfort with indebtedness, also influence enrollment decisions. These factors are
again difficult to capture in an aggregate dataset, and are not explicitly included here.
We include a total of thirteen proxy variables for the underlying factors in the
dataset, with seven variables aimed at explaining demand, five at explaining supply,
and one endogenous variable (net tuition price) believed to shift both supply and de-
mand. Other proxy variables were considered in the original dataset and are provided
in appendix B.3. These other variables were discarded in preliminary analysis as in-
ferior proxies for underlying variables. Table 3.1 gives a summary of the candidate
proxy variables. The majority of data are from the Digest of Education Statistics
maintained by the National Center for Education Statistics. A complete dataset for
the period 1976–2007 is constructed by extrapolation based on the available data
points. For the complete dataset and calculation details see appendix B.3.
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Table 3.1: Dataset summary.
Candidate driver Proxy variables Model Variable description
Quantity Enrollment Full-time equivalent enrollment at




Endowment value per student Supply Average Harvard/Yale endowment
market value, per studentb
Endowment distribution per stu-
dent
Supply Yale endowment spending, per student
Donations per student Supply Donations, per student (voluntary sup-
port from persons and companies)
Cost of operations Higher Education Price Index Supply HEPI inflation indexc
Financial aid to
schools per student
Aid to schools per student Supply Total government support directly to
schools, per student (federal, state,
and local)
Benefit of college Earnings difference Demand Earnings difference (bachelor’s degree
or higher average - high school degree
average)
Expenditures by schools Demand Expenditures by schools, per student
Unemployment Demand US unemployment rate
Disposable income Demand US per capita disposable income
Grant aid to stu-
dents per student




Student loans per student Demand Average federal loan amount per full-
time-equivalent student
Household debt per student Demand US household debt, per student
Net tuition per stu-
dent
Net tuition per student Both Average tuition and fees - institutional
aid, per student
aNon-tuition revenue per student, benefit of college, and credit effects are each summarized in a
single proxy variable which represents the first principal component of the underlying proxies listed
here. These principal component proxies appear in the final models.
bHarvard and Yale endowment values are chosen as proxies since their investing strategies serve
as a model for other schools and because data are publicly available.
cThe Higher Education Price Index (HEPI) is an inflation index which tracks price changes for
the basket of good commonly purchased by institutions of higher education, making it more specific
than e.g. Consumer Price Index. It is computed annually and distributed free of charge by the
Commonfund Institute (Commonfund Institute, 2009). The Index is used by schools to assist in
the budgeting process. Categories included in the HEPI index are salaries for faculty and other
employees, fringe benefits, utilities, supplies and materials, and miscellaneous services. HEPI index
is adjusted for inflation during the time period studied here.
3.4 Model
The dataset described above creates several problems for regression modeling.
Since multiple proxy variables for the same underlying candidate supply/demand
driver are considered, there is strong correlation among the variables. In order to
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reduce this correlation, we use principal component analysis to identify a single proxy
variable for some candidate drivers. Specifically, we develop single proxy variables
for non-tuition revenue in the supply model as well as for the benefit of a college
education and credit in the demand model (see table 3.1 for proxy variables and
candidate driver categories). We do not use principal component analysis across all
candidate drivers since this would make coefficient signs difficult to interpret in the
final models. Similarly, we avoid using principal components for variables which are
of particular interest. A summary of the first principal components for non-tuition
revenue, benefit of college, and credit are provided in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Summary of first principal components.a
Supply Demand
Non-tuition revenue per student Credit factors
Proportion of variance 0.916 Proportion of variance 0.633
Standard deviation 1.654 Standard deviation 1.126
Loadings: Loadings:
Endowment value per student 0.706 Household debt per student 0.707
Endowment distribution per student 0.708 Student loans per student 0.707
Donations per student -0.018
Benefit of college




Expenditures by schools -0.361
Unemployment 0.459
Disposable income -0.633
aFor detailed variable descriptions see table 3.1.
A second problem with the dataset is that variation is often driven by a strong
time trend. To reduce concern that model fit is strong only because we are able to
capture growth patterns, all variables are inflation adjusted. Additionally, we remove
a linear trend as in equation (3.1) from all data:
x(t)detrended = x(t)actual − b− a(t− 1976) (3.1)
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where x(t) is the variable in year t, with linear growth rate a and intercept b.
This adjustment eliminates correlation among residuals in the supply model and
reduces correlation in the demand model (for details see appendix B.7). A linear
trend is chosen because this provides a better fit than an exponential curve for most
variables. A sample plot of the actual and detrended net tuition variable is provided
in figure 3.1. We continue to see heteroskedasticity and cyclical residuals even after
this adjustment (see appendix B.5). To account for this, we introduce a first order
lagged autoregressive error term (see e.g. Chatfield (2009)).
Figure 3.1: Example of variable detrending. Detrended net tuition per student (left
axis, dotted) and actual net tuition per student (right axis, line). For detailed variable
descriptions see table 3.1.
A third issue we must address is the endogeneity of the price variable, net tuition.
Net tuition price shifts both demand and supply, violating ordinary least squares
orthogonality assumptions. The two-stage least squares approach provides a method
for adjusting a least squares model to account for the presence of endogenous variables
(see e.g. Hayashi (2000)). Table 3.3 provides a list of candidate instrumental variables
for the first stage estimation in each model.
Using the two-stage least squares approach, we develop the basic structure of
the two models, which are provided in equations (3.2)–(3.4). These are not the
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Table 3.3: Instrumental variables for the first stage regression of net tuition, equations
(3.2)–(3.4).
Model Instrumental variables useda,b
Supply model College benefit
Credit effects per student
Demand model HEPI
Non-tuition revenue per student
Aid to schools per student
aInstrumental variables in the supply model are factors that shift net tuition but not supply.
Instrumental variables in the demand model are factors that shift net tuition but not demand.
bFor detailed variable descriptions see table 3.1.
final supply and demand models, but rather starting points for model identification.
We include the first order autoregressive error term to account for heteroskedastic
error terms caused by the time series nature of the input data (Chatfield, 2009). In
this model, we use exogenous variables from the demand model as the instrumental
variables in the supply regression (see e.g. Angrist and Krueger (2010)) and vice
versa, yielding the same first stage regression for supply and demand. The first
stage equation is presented in equation (3.4). All model equations are developed at
a particular time (particular year) t for simplicity.
Supply model:
enrollmentt = a0 (3.2)
+ aex[costOfOperations, nonTuitionRevenue, aidToSchools]t
+ aen[netTuition]t + Yt
Yt = b0Yt−1 + eS,t
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Demand model:
enrollmentt = c0 (3.3)
+ cex[benefitOfCollege, grantAidToStudents, creditEffects]t
+ cen[netTuition]t +Wt
Wt = d0Wt−1 + eDt
First stage:
netTuitiont = f0 (3.4)
+ fS[costOfOperations, nonTuitionRevenue, aidToSchools]t
+ fD[benefitOfCollege, grantAidToStudents, creditEffects]t + e1t
We estimate the two-stage least squares models in equations (3.2)–(3.4) in a single
step using R’s built-in two-stage least squares function4. We transform the original
input variables in equations (3.2)–(3.4) to remove autocorrelation of error terms by
first estimating b0 and c0 in equations (3.2) and (3.3). Upon model estimation, all
results are transformed back into the original data space for reporting. All statistics
and standard errors reported in the following sections assume that b0 and c0 are
estimated without error. For more about the estimation of models with autocorrelated
error terms, see e.g. Pandit and Wu (1990).
3.5 Results
Since we reduce the number of candidate variables and eliminate sources of collinear-
ity prior to model fitting, almost all variables in the initial models are significant
drivers of enrollment and are therefore present in the final models. There are two
4Fox, John. Package ‘sem’. CRAN. 2010.
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notable exceptions in the demand model. Firstly, grant aid to students (per student)
falls out due to strong correlation with student loans (per student), which is included
in the credit effects principal component. Secondly, tuition is excluded from the final
model here. We test a model where tuition in the demand model is adjusted for
grant aid, i.e. net tuition = list tuition - institutional aid - grant aid. Signs in this
adjusted model are consistent with the model in table 3.4, but correlation between
grants and student loan aid makes it difficult to interpret credit effects. Tuition price
has a positive sign when included in the model.5
Table 3.4: Supply model (enrollment per high school graduate, equation (3.2)).
Two-stage least squares regression
b0 (residual autocorrelation) 0.838
Correlation (model estimates vs. actual)a 0.73
Exclusion restrictions Test statistic p-value
Sargan 1.9837 0.1590
Basmann 1.7183 0.1899
Variableb Coefficient value St. error p-value
(Intercept) -0.0069 0.0140
Cost of operations (HEPI) 0.0434 0.0101 0.0002
Non-tuition revenue per student -0.2423 0.0546 0.0002
Financial aid to schools per student 0.0002 0.0001 0.0320
Net tuition per student -0.0015 0.0006 0.0152
aModel fit is captured by the correlation between the model estimates and actual values of supply
and demand.
bFor detailed variable descriptions see table 3.1.
Table 3.5: Demand model (enrollment per high school graduate, equation (3.3)).
Ordinary least squares regression
d0 (residual autocorrelation) 0.653
Correlation (model estimates vs. actual)a 0.73
Variableb Coefficient value St. error p-value
(Intercept) -0.0027 0.0119
Benefit of college 0.0319 0.0148 0.0399
Credit effects per student -0.0790 0.0241 0.0028
aModel fit is captured by the correlation between the model estimates and actual values of supply
and demand
bFor detailed variable descriptions see table 3.1.
5Note that since tuition falls out of demand model, we use ordinary least squares with a first-order
autocorrelation term to estimate the demand model.
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(a) Supply model. (b) Demand model.
Figure 3.2: Model enrollment (line) and actual enrollment (circles), detrended.a
aModels are presented in tables 3.4 and 3.5. Models are based on equations (3.2)-(3.3).
Model robustness is difficult to test explicitly since small sample size precludes
out-of-sample testing. When using time series data as individual observations, we
must account for endogenous differences between different time periods. However,
it is not possible to include, or even observe, all factors that may change over time
(see e.g. Deming and Dynarski (2009)). Since we are using time points as individual
observations, traditional fixed effects techniques (see discussion in e.g. Park (2009))
cannot be applied here. Alternatively, the autocorrelation term accounts for changing
effects, creating a dynamic model which adjusts for changes in unobserved variables
over time. This is similar to a dynamic approach for panel data that uses lagged
observations to account for time trends (see e.g. Dhring and Mordonu (2007)). Addi-
tionally, we compare model estimates using different types of standard errors, noting
that standard and robust errors yield similar results (see e.g. Knutsen (2012)).
Since we are primarily interested in determining accurate coefficient signs, we
focus model testing around these signs. We compare model signs with those from
a pre-estimation test, in which each proxy variable is used to individually predict
enrollment (for more detail regarding the pre-estimation test see appendix B.4). Signs
are generally consistent between the final model and the pre-estimation test, except
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as noted in appendix B.4. We further test model robustness by examining coefficient
signs across two sub-periods, from 1976 to 1990 and from 1991 to 2007. We find
that coefficients are generally stable between these two periods. Detailed results of
this analysis are provided in appendix B.6. Finally, we test the validity and strength
of the instrumental variables used in the first stage regression of the supply model.
Sargan’s and Basmann’s chi-squared tests reveal that the instrumental variables used
for tuition in the supply model are valid, as shown in tables 3.4 and 3.5 (see e.g. Hipp
et al. (2011) for more on these tests). The first stage regression yields an F-statistic
of only 3.97 and a p-value of 0.01. This is a weakness in the specification, but limited
data availability and consistency prevents us from adding additional instruments.
However, model fit appears good given the small sample size, with an adjusted R2 of
0.33. We also find consistent coefficient signs when using models that use ordinary
differences instead of log differences, and when using aggregate rather than normalized
per student data. This demonstrates that coefficient signs are not driven by the
normalization factors.
The final models shown in tables 3.4 and 3.5 indicate that price and credit factors
play a significant role in determining supply and demand for higher education. On
the demand side, preliminary models which include tuition suggest that demand rises
with tuition price, consistent with findings such as Dale and Krueger (1999) and
John (1992). Tuition seems to provide some indication of quality or benefit, leading
consumers to respond this way to increasing prices.6 On the other hand, the principal
component variable of credit effects (per student), composed of the underlying proxy
variables household debt (per student) and student loans (per student), has a negative
effect on demand. Inside the principal component, both household debt (per student)
6Note that net tuition price used in these models, though adjusted for institutional aid, is not
adjusted for grants, meaning this variable does not necessarily represent the price actually paid by
students. Grant aid is highly correlated with net tuition (correlation is 76%), and therefore falls out
of the final model. Creation of a grant-adjusted net tuition variable (i.e. tuition - institutional aid
- grant aid) produces a model similar to that provided in table 3.5.
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and student loans (per student) have a positive sign, implying that increased student
loans and increased debt reduce enrollment demand. A possible explanation for this,
which is supported by current high debt and default rates, is that families are not
willing to take on additional debt to pay for an education. Students must find a
balance between their desire to attend expensive schooling and their aversion to debt.
We find further support for this hypothesis by splitting the tuition variable into
two components. The first component, expense change, is the portion of net tuition
that is perfectly correlated with the cost of operations, i.e. the HEPI index. Expense
change measures the rise in tuition caused by an increase in the cost for the same
basket of goods purchase by schools. The second component, offerings change, rep-
resents the portion of net tuition price change that is not correlated with the HEPI
index. This component represents changes in student offerings, such as better facili-
ties and more academic and extracurricular resources. Inserting these two variables
into the demand model in table 3.5, we see that offerings changes are significant and
lead to demand growth, producing an effect counter to the traditional economic effect
of decreasing demand as prices rise. Expense changes do not appear to be signifi-
cant, suggesting price-inelastic demand in the traditional sense; demand for education
does not fall as price increases when other factors remain constant. This degree of
price-inelasticity is likely made possible by government loans and other subsidies. As
explained above, credit constraints may allow rising tuition to reduce demand in an
indirect way. This effect would likely be amplified if government loans to credit-
constrained individuals were reduced. Details of the separated demand models are
provided in appendix B.2.7 Credit effects are the main drivers behind changes in
demand, appearing as highly significant in all models tested.
We also see that credit variables and net tuition price are highly correlated. Fig-
ure 3.3 provides a visual representation of the relationship between these variables
7Note that we exclude expenditures from the principal component estimate of college benefit for
these models, as expenditures is now included as a separate variable.
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over time. Even after removing the time trend, net tuition price (per student) and
household debt (per student) exhibit a correlation of 91.5%, implying that families
are responding to rising prices by borrowing. This relationship, though intuitive, has
not been pointed out in past literature to our knowledge. We conclude that people
cannot afford increasingly expensive schools and are willing to take on only limited
debt, reducing the demand in times when credit is readily available, debt levels are
already high, and net tuition is also high.
(a) Detrended net tuition (left axis,
dotted) and detrended household debt
(right axis, line), per student.
(b) Detrended net tuition (left axis,
dotted) and detrended student loans
(right axis, line), per student.
Figure 3.3: Detrended net tuition and credit variables. Detrended net tuition is the
same in both plots above. For detailed variable descriptions see table 3.1.
The final significant variable in the demand model in table 3.5 is benefit of a
college education. Due to the difficulty of measuring this benefit, we can say only
that metrics of the benefits of college are important in predicting demand. Proxies
used here include earnings difference between high school and bachelor’s graduates,
spending by schools as a metric of services and facilities offered, unemployment rate,
and per capita disposable income. These variables are selected because they have
been identified as drivers in past research and because they provide basic metrics of
the health of the overall economy (Fortin, 2006).
In the supply model shown in table 3.4, cost of operations, non-tuition revenue
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(per student), aid to schools (per student), and net tuition price (per student) are
significant. Cost of operations is measured via Commonfund’s Higher Education Price
Index, which is an inflation index for the basket of goods that institutions of higher
education generally purchase. An increase in this index implies that the cost for the
same offering goes up, rather than that schools increase their offerings to students by
adding new facilities, programs or staff. Since supply rises with cost of operations,
we conclude that schools enroll more students partly in order to cover increasing
costs. A similar trend is suggested by the coefficient of non-tuition revenue (per
student). As shown in table 3.1, this driver includes endowment value (per student),
endowment distribution (the portion of the endowment actually spent, per student),
and voluntary donations (per student).8 Enrollment falls with non-tuition revenue
(per student), implying that schools can afford to enroll fewer students when they
receive revenue from non-tuition sources. This makes sense in light of the non-profit
nature of most colleges. An exception to this is government aid, which may come with
stipulations about services offered or be associated with a particular group of students.
However, aid directly to schools alone is not a significant driver of enrollment in the
pre-estimation test (see appendix B.4). Increases in overall spending certainly increase
enrollment, but our findings suggest that funding from some particular sources may
have the opposite effect.
The last significant variable in the supply model in table 3.4 is net tuition price,
which is adjusted for institutional aid to reflect the payment schools actually receive
from students. We cannot treat net tuition price as a true predictor in the supply
model because consumer demand is relatively price inelastic. Since many students are
awarded grant aid, they do not pay list tuition price, meaning that schools are fairly
free to set tuition prices as they see fit. However, the sensitivity to debt levels seen in
8Note that the endowment variables drive the non-tuition revenue principal component. Endow-
ment data include only Harvard and Yale because of data availability and because these schools
serve as models for other endowment funds.
35
the demand model suggests that some price sensitivity is present. Net tuition price
is highly correlated with expenditures (correlation is 88%), which we omit from the
supply model for this reason and because expenditures are determined by revenue
for many schools due to their non-profit status (see figure 3.4). This is similar to
Peña (2006), who finds that institution-level tuition price is highly correlated with
school’s wealth.9 The sign of the net tuition variable in our model suggests that
higher net tuition price decreases supply, which is not intuitive. Taking into account
the correlation with wealth (as in Peña (2006)) and expenditures, we can interpret the
coefficient on tuition price at least partially as the effect of increased spending on new
services and facilities for students. Higher quality, more expensive schools can afford
to admit fewer students at higher prices, allowing schools to shrink supply. Students
pay not only for an education, but for high-end athletic facilities and hundreds of
student organizations. High school graduates are starting to expect these services
from institutions of higher education (see e.g. Hacker and Dreifus (2010)). Our
model supports the theory that schools succeed by increasing offerings and becoming
more high-end and more expensive. These trends might pose a problem to students
and may have contributed to the rapid price increases of the past thirty years.
3.6 Conclusion
This work models the dynamics of supply and demand in college education to
provide a macro-level picture of the market. Our findings show that credit, financial
aid, and pricing have a large effect on enrollment in higher education. We see that
there exists a strong relationship between price, spending and wealth of schools,
tuition levels, student loans, and indebtedness. We show how these relationships may
lead to an upward spiral of tuition prices. Consumers desire more prestigious, more
expensive education, allowing tuition price to become a signal for quality. Rankings
9Wealth is measured by endowment values and the gap between tuition revenue and expenditures.
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Figure 3.4: Detrended net tuition per student (left axis, dotted) and detrended ex-
penditures per student (right axis, line). Detrended net tuition is the same as in
figure 3.3. For detailed variable descriptions see table 3.1.
tied to tuition prices, facilities and services, and spending per student may amplify
this effect. Based on the strong correlation between household debt levels and tuition
price, we conclude that families turn to loans when faced with increasing prices. This
leads to the need for a larger lending industry and, in turn, allows schools to charge
more. On the other hand, credit constraints are a definite factor in demand side
enrollment decisions, forcing consumers to battle with conflicting desires of attending
a more expensive school and containing debt levels The benefit of college, including
spending by schools, student loan amounts, and tuition price drive demand, while
school’s operational costs, government aid to schools, tuition price, and non-tuition
revenue shift supply. Several factors, such as increased resources and facilities for
students, public perception of prestige, and/or ranking criteria linked to tuition prices,
drive schools to become more expensive. Meanwhile, current financial aid structures
fail to curb the resulting trend towards higher prices.
The models developed here succeed in identifying relevant drivers and their di-
rectional relationships. However, the causal relationships between highly correlated
variables should be investigated further. Specifically, future research will help estab-
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lish causal links between credit factors, aid, and tuition in the demand model as well
as expenditures and tuition in the supply model. Changes to financial aid programs
and incentive structures may allow us to decrease the risk of financial instability, ease
financial strain for American families, increase the impact of government financial




A major choice: An examination of educational
choices, student characteristics, and
ability-adjusted income
4.1 Introduction
We study post-college income across a representative sample of college applicants,
and develop a model to study drivers of the decision to attend college and the choice
between institutions. This analysis informs students, parents, and policymakers about
the effects of educational choices on future earnings and the role these earnings play
in the decision process. We introduce a new method to account for bias caused by
endogenous ability differences in students. We find that post-college income levels
are primarily driven by student ability and major choice, not by the quality of the
school attended. However, school quality is a primary driver of students’ attendance
and institutional choice decisions.
Returns to schooling may depend on a variety of factors. Papers such as Brewer
et al. (1999), Dale and Krueger (2011), and Cunha and Miller (2012) examine the
effect of institutional characteristics on earnings outcomes. While Brewer et al. (1999)
find that attending a highly selective school has a positive impact on future earnings,
improved debiasing methods used by Dale and Krueger (2011) reveal that effects are
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smaller than previously thought. A similar result is found by Cunha and Miller (2012),
who show that large differences in earnings, graduation rate, and persistence across
schools attended are greatly reduced after adjusting for student characteristics. Our
analysis, using the new debiasing approach, supports the results of Dale and Krueger
(2011) and Cunha and Miller (2012). A study by Hoekstra (2009) suggests that
earnings gains from attending a state’s flagship university over other schooling options
may yield as much as a 20% increase in earnings for marginal students (those near
the admissions cutoff for that school). However, this work does not include data on
alternative schooling choices made by those who do not attend the flagship university
or information on major choice. Our data include details about admissions success at
several schools as well as major selection, capturing much more information on the
ability and schooling decisions of each student. For example, we show that attending
any school at all has a significant positive effect on income, so earnings differences in
Hoekstra (2009) may be driven by differences in the percentage of students attending
college at all. Aside from school choice, major choice is also a significant source of
income disparity. Carnevale et al. (2013) show that income variation across majors in
often larger than the variation across institutions attended. In this chapter, we show
that major choice affects income even after adjusting for student ability differences.
This is consistent with results in e.g. Arcidiacono (2004), who studies the effect of
student ability on major sorting and finds that major choices are driven by personal
preferences instead of the promise of monetary benefit. He also shows that major
choice has an effect on earnings even after adjusting for ability sorting into different
majors. Our work contributes to the school choice literature by demonstrating that
major choice has a greater impact on future earnings than quality of the school
attended, even though student decisions appear to be driven by quality concerns.
We construct a two-stage model of college choice, using a binary logit model for the
attendance decision and an alternatives-based conditional logit model for the choice
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between schools. We find that student ability and school quality of the most desirable
school admitted to predict college attendance, while choice between schools is driven
by financial concerns and school quality. The choice models developed in this chapter
show that school quality and prestige are important factors in student’s decisions
about college attendance, suggesting that students and parents either believe that
strong income differences exist based on quality of the school attended, or that they
find quality inherently valuable. School quality drives school choice even though we
do not find a significant impact of the quality of the school attended on earnings for
most groups.
We use uniquely detailed data on college applications, acceptance, and attendance
from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2013). Detailed individual-level data allow us to use information on the
best school to which a student was admitted to adjust for intrinsic ability differences
and identify drivers of post-college income after this adjustment. Our school quality
metric is based on the selectivity of each school, meaning the percentage of applicants
that are accepted for study. The selectivity metric uses data from Barron’s selectivity
index (Barron’s, 2009). We use post-college income data reported in the National
Longitudinal Survey to study income differences. Additionally, this dataset provides
information on major, student and family characteristics including SAT scores, and
financial aid offers which allow us to accurately capture the decisions facing each
individual student.
Our model shows that student characteristics such as family background, math-
ematical ability, and major choice are much better predictor of future income than
college attendance or school choice after removing sample bias. With the exception
of attendance at an elite institution, quality of the school attended does not appear
to have an effect on post-college earnings after adjusting for ability. Attending college
at all is associated with an increase in earnings, but the benefit of college attendance
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is not significantly different across students of different abilities. Future income is
determined primarily by student ability, the decision to attend college at all, major
choice, and attendance at an elite university.
We can see some of these results in raw post-college income data, which is pre-
sented in figure 4.1. Figure 4.1a portrays average income by the selectivity of the
top school admitted to. We see a general downward trend in the whole sample (bar
graph), with income declining as selectivity of the top school admitted to decreases.
Income by the top school admitted to conditioned on the selectivity of the school
attended is also displayed (lines). The effect of the attendance decision varies across
groups:
• Conditional average income by school attended generally falls within the 95%
confidence interval of unconditional (overall sample) average income (dotted
lines).
• An exception occurs for student students who attend an elite university. For
students who are admitted to a type 1 (top) school, attendance at this type 1
school appears to significantly increase post-college income (dark blue).
• Non-attenders consistently exhibit lower post-college income than attenders,
with the exception of students accepted to only the lowest selectivity (type
5/6) schools (green).
Appendix C.1 provides an alternate look at this income information, displaying in-
come levels by selectivity of the school attended, conditional on the selectivity of the
top school admitted to.
Figure 4.1b displays the same information on post-college income by top school
admitted to. Lines indicate average post-college income for two major categories
that exhibit above- and below-average incomes after adjusting for intrinsic ability
and several other factors, as explained further in section 4.5.1. Those majoring in
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business and especially engineering and computer related fields exhibit above-average
post-college incomes across categories. Those majoring in social sciences, education,
and fine arts have lower post-college salaries, especially among students admitted
to top schools. This is true even after adjusting for student ability, suggesting that
wage premiums for engineering majors are not caused only by self-selection of the best
students into these programs. We continue to see this difference between majors after
adjusting for mathematical ability (math SAT score), further suggesting that major
choice affects salary beyond underlying student characteristics. We show in section
4.5.2 that major choice has a significant effect on income even for top students who
attend elite universities. We also see similar results when using math SAT score as a
proxy for student ability instead of the top school admitted to. However, significance
levels are lower due to the fact that SAT data is only available for about one third of
the students in our sample.
This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 4.2 provides some context for
this work. Section 4.3 familiarizes the reader with the input data. Sections 4.4 and
4.5 explain the new debiasing approach introduced in this chapter, the analysis of
post-college income, and preliminary work on lifetime income projection. Section 4.6
presents the two-stage model of college choice. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 provide concluding
remarks and future related work.
4.2 Background and literature review
Understanding the college attendance decision is important and currently relevant
as college costs rise and the benefits of higher education become less obvious. Changes
in the higher education and employment landscapes along with a new book by former
Secretary of Education William Bennett have sparked a lively debate on the value and
benefits of higher education in academic circles and the popular media (see e.g. Berger
(2013), Selingo (2013), Carnevale et al. (2009)) (Bennett and Wilezol, 2013). Average
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(a) Average income over the first four
years after expected college graduation
by selectivity of the best school admit-
ted to (bars), with 95% confidence in-
tervals. Lines indicate income by selec-
tivity of school admitted to after con-
ditioning on selectivity of school at-
tended. Dotted lines indicate no dif-
ferences from average post-college in-
come. Attenders at elite universi-
ties have higher earnings (dark blue)
while non-attenders have lower earn-
ings (green). Type 1 indicates most se-
lective schools.
(b) Average income over the first four
years after expected college graduation
by selectivity of the best school admit-
ted to (bars), with 95% confidence in-
tervals. Lines indicate income by major
choice for business/engineering (blue,
higher income) and social sciences/arts
(red, lower income). Type 1 indicates
most selective schools.
Figure 4.1: Average income over the first four years after expected college gradua-
tion by selectivity of top school admitted to, with effects of attendance and major
decisions. a,b,c,d
aExpected college graduation is considered to be four years after the beginning of a college
education for those attending college, and four years after the start of the academic year for which
students applied to college for those not attending.
bSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s selectivity index (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are
combined into a single category. Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted.
cSelected sample is presented in table 4.1 and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals included are those from the cross-sectional sample who
completed high school, participated in the college choice section of the survey, were admitted to at
least one four-year institution, and are not missing critical data.
dMajor choice is based on the initial program decision made upon entering college. It does not
necessarily reflect the final major in which a degree was attained, since some students change majors
or do not complete their studies. Engineering/business majors include engineering, business, and
computer-related fields. Social sciences/arts includes social sciences such as psychology, archeology,
education, political science, sociology, and theology as well as fine arts studies.
list tuition and fees at four-year public colleges have been rising at an average annual
rate of 5.2% above inflation throughout the last decade (The College Board, 2012b).
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While private school tuition is growing less quickly, private institutions historically
charge the highest prices. Students finance increasingly expensive education with
private and federal loans; the student loan business disbursed a total of $113.4 billion
in such loans in the 2011-12 academic year (The College Board, 2012c). Private
and government groups voice concerns about the quality and risk of student loan
debt, and consumers are more and more reluctant to take on loans in a society that is
deleveraging across the board (see e.g. Klein (2013)). With a general slow-down in the
economy, salaries of bachelors degree recipients are stagnant, but degree-holders still
earn considerably higher salaries than high-school graduates without a higher degree
(The College Board, 2012a). Additionally, unemployment rates are much lower for
those with a college or higher degree than those without, though unemployment has
risen across the board. Wage increases from college attendance are especially large
for minorities and women, who have historically had lower rates of college attendance
(Becker and Murphy, 2007).
The college choice literature has historically focused on access to higher education,
methods for increasing college attendance, and differences in college attendance rates
across groups (Perna, 2006). College enrollment in the United States has increased
steadily over the past twenty years, but attendance rates continue to be lower for
students from less wealthy families (Mortenson, 2001). Bachelor’s degree recipients
earned on average 66% more in 2010 than those with only a high school degree,
motivating studies focused on increased college access and better financial aid policies
(The College Board, 2012a). As variance in earnings for those attending different
institutions grows, researchers increasingly focus on the choice between schools in
addition to the decision of whether or not to attend school at all. For example, Avery
and Hoxby (2003) examine the effect of financial aid on choice between institutions,
finding that students are highly sensitive to grant and loan packages. Similarly,
Hurwitz (2012) takes advantage of exogenous differences between schools’ financial aid
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policies to study effects of institutional grant aid. Drewes and Michael (2006) find that
institutional characteristics such as school size, services offered, class size, research
activity, and rankings have an effect on a school’s attractiveness to potential enrollees.
Returns on a degree vary widely based on the school attended and major chosen,
with aid-adjusted returns ranging from −15% to +15% across schools (PayScale.com,
2013). The benefits of a college education also depend on successful completion of a
degree. Out of full-time college students tracked by the US government, only around
30% are recorded as graduating from the university they originally chose to attend,
with many failing to complete any degree at all (The Chronicle of Higher Education,
2013). A college degree no longer guarantees a secure, well-paying job as it did
a generation ago. A rise in the variance of earnings among college graduates makes
college a much more risky investment than it used to be (Brown et al., 2012). Growth
in the for-profit education sector, the rise of Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs)
and other alternative higher education models, and the general re-balancing of the
economy threaten the status quo in the higher education market, and may change
the way students make decisions about college attendance in the future.
Many methods are available for measuring the returns to schooling. Traditionally,
papers on educational returns follow either the human capital or signaling schools of
thought. In the human capital view, education benefits its participants by improving
their skill set and making them more valuable to employers.1 Under the signaling
model, school admissions and attendance serves primarily as a signal of intrinsic stu-
dent ability, making it easier for employers to identify high-value candidates. Because
it is difficult to separate these effects, researchers often focus on controlled or natu-
ral experiments to distinguish between them. Hämäläinen and Uusitalo (2008), for
example, take advantage of a policy change in Finland to investigate the effect of
attending a more prestigious “polytechnic” instead of a vocational college. They find
1For more on human capital models see Becker (1994) and related works.
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evidence for the signaling model of education, suggesting that educational benefit on
earnings is driven by the signal of ability instead of superior education taking place
at the more prestigious schools. Manoli (2008) uses a change in compulsory schooling
policy in the United Kingdom to compare signaling and human capital models. He
finds that attainment of a diploma has a greater effect in terms of future earnings
than the number of years of schooling received, again showing support for the signal-
ing model. When natural experiments are not available, an alternative approach is to
develop a sophisticated method for debiasing, adjusting for intrinsic student ability
differences between groups before measuring educational returns. The current study
contributes to this literature by introducing an improved debiasing method based on
admissions decisions made by universities.
Some positive changes are starting to be implemented in the college decision en-
vironment. For example, there is a call for better information to enable improved
decision-making and risk assessment. Government and private groups are pushing
for increased emphasis on college accountability, oversight, and reporting of out-
comes. One example of such a campaign is the Obama administration’s introduc-
tion of the College Scorecard, which provides accepted students with information
on costs, graduation rates, and default rates relative to other schools around the
country (Department of Education: College Affordability and Transparency Center,
2013). User-friendly interfaces on government and private databases also provide in-
formation that may help in the college decision process (see e.g. National Center
for Education Statistics (2009), Department of Education (2013), and PayScale.com
(2013)). Several states, including Arkansas, Colorado, Tennessee, Texas, and Vir-
ginia, now work with College Measures, a group that compiles data on employment
outcomes of graduates from different institutions. Students and parents can compare
post-graduation earnings by school and major (College Measures, 2013).
The choice model presented in this chapter follows most directly from the work
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of Long (2004b), who studies the changing factors influencing college attendance and
choice decisions over time. Long uses an earlier cohort of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth as well as the High School and Beyond dataset and the National
Education Longitudinal Study 1988. Long presents a two-stage logistic choice model,
modeling the attendance decision via a binary logit model and college choice via
an alternative-based conditional logit model. She finds that college preferences are
affected by price, distance to the college, and similarity to ability levels of peers at
that college. Long finds that the importance of price has declined over time in the
attendance decision, but that price continues to be a significant factor when deciding
between schools. We compare our findings to Long’s work throughout this chapter,
and find that our results are generally consistent with her conclusions. Although
our dataset is too small to confirm all of Long’s results, we take advantage of richer
information on each individual and potential school to test the importance of a larger
number of factors. We expand upon past research and Long’s model by combining a
college choice model with a focus on the effect of schooling decisions on income, by
introducing a new method of adjusting for ability bias, and by focusing on drivers of
income differences after making this adjustment.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Data sources
Individual student data used in this project come from the 1997 cohort of the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY 97) (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).
NLSY surveys are designed to follow a representative groups of students throughout
their adult life, tracking employment, life events, health, and other areas of interest.
The NLSY 1997 survey follows approximately 9,000 individuals who were born be-
tween the years of 1980 and 1984. They have been interviewed on an annual basis
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since 1997, and data continue to be collected. The latest available data are from the
2010 survey. While older cohorts of the NLSY would provide more data points, espe-
cially for our evaluation of labor income, older cohorts do not include a set of questions
focusing on college choice and are less relevant to today’s high school graduates.
Our work draws on a subset of the NLSY 97 data, namely youths born in 1984.
This subgroup of NLSY 1997 participants was selected to participate in a unique
college choice portion of the survey, in which they were asked questions regarding all
colleges they applied to, whether they were accepted, and whether aid was received.
While all students, including those in older versions of the NLSY, are asked about the
college(s) they chose to attend, the college choice dataset is unique in that it allows
us to explicitly track college applications, admissions, and financial aid. Students
in our cohort of interest turned eighteen years old in 2002 and are included in our
sample if they applied to and were admitted to at least one college within two years
of high school graduation. Demographic, residential, and other personal information
about students is available within the survey data. Data that have the potential to
uniquely identify students, such as geographical and school name information, were
attained through a special license from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Data on individual students are supplemented by information on the colleges that
survey respondents applied to and attended. While some school-specific informa-
tion, such as financial aid awarded, is captured in the NLSY 97, most information
pertaining directly to schools comes from the Department of Education’s Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (National Center for Education Statistics,
2009). Data include information on college finances, academic quality, location, and
student body characteristics. To ensure consistency with information available to
students at the time of their college decision, data from the 2002-2003 school year are
used wherever possible.
Other sources of data include school selectivity information derived from Bar-
49
ron’s Competitiveness Index and United States Postal Service zip code latitude and
longitude information (Barron’s, 2009). Barron’s rankings were obtained through a
restricted use license from the Department of Education. A list of variables used in
model development is available in appendix C.2.
4.3.2 Sample selection
From the 9,000 individuals surveyed in the NLSY 1997, we select individuals that
fit a variety of criteria making them suitable to our analysis. We are interested in
the traditional post-high-school college decision process for those individuals that
consider four-year institutions, and we require information on admissions for our
debiasing work. Therefore, we reduce the sample as follows:
• Focus on cross-sectional sample that is designed to give a representative sample,
excluding those from the Black and Hispanic oversample group. This leaves
6,748 individuals.2
• Select individuals from the 1984 cohort who completed high school. These
individuals participated in the college choice section of the survey. There are
2,191 such individuals in the sample.
• Select individuals that applied and were accepted to at least one four-year in-
stitution, leaving 1,223 individuals.
• Remove individuals that apply to only international or specialty schools or
where schools listed are not in IPEDS dataset. This leaves 1,121 applicants
applying to a total of 914 colleges.
• Remove individuals where income data or critical regression data are missing.
We require sufficient post-college income data for the analysis outlined in section
2Oversample groups are included in the NLSY for researchers who wish to study impact of race
and ethnicity. Oversampling ensures enough data points from individuals in minority groups for
whom it would otherwise be difficult to establish sufficient sample sizes.
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4.5. Regression inputs for key variables have very low missingness rates and do
not have a significant impact on the number of usable data points.
• The final sample contains 1,053 individuals, including 796 four-year college at-
tenders, as described in table 4.1. A small number of additional exclusions are
necessary for some portions of the analysis presented here.
Table 4.1: Number of students in sample, by attendance and admission groups. Type
1 indicates most selective schools.a,b
Selectivity of school attended
More selective Less selective
1 2 3 4 5,6 Non-attenders Total
More 1 39 21 27 18 0 16 121
Best selective 2 56 44 29 7 19 155
school 3 155 64 17 61 297
admitted Less 4 222 25 108 355
selective 5,6 72 53 125
Total 39 77 226 333 121 257 1,053
aSample is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals
included are those from the cross-sectional sample who completed high school, participated in the
college choice section of the survey, were admitted to at least one four-year institution, and are not
missing critical data.
bSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s selectivity index, which measures the acceptance rate
of students who have applied for study (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are combined into a single
category. Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted.
Table 4.1 gives some interesting insights into the college attendance decision. We
see that it is quite common for students to attend schools below the level of the top
school to which they were admitted. It is especially common to attend a school one
type below one’s top admitted option. Very few of the top students choose to attend
schools in the least selective category. The top school admitted to is an especially
common choice for those who were not admitted to the very highest types. We also
see that most students fall into the middle admission categories, with a top admitted
school in type 4 being the most common. Non-attendance is most common among
students admitted only to lower-type schools, but occurs among all students.
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4.4 Debiasing: Creating university and student groups
4.4.1 A new approach for addressing selection bias in school choice
One of the main contributions of this work is the introduction of a novel method
for adjusting for endogenous student ability. Thanks to our unique data on the
college application process, we can use an individual’s success in college admissions
to develop an understanding of his or her intrinsic ability. We condition on the
Barron’s selectivity index score of the best school to which a student was admitted,
allowing us to reduce sample bias in our study of the effect of the attendance decision
on income. School selectivity categories correspond to Barron’s selectivity categories.
Type 1 schools have acceptance rates of at most 33% while type 5 and 6 schools admit
100% of their applicants. We group type 5 and 6 schools (least selective) together
due to the small number of observations for these school types.
Selectivity is used as the basis for forming school groups since it is common in the
literature, it is available for our dataset, and it captures the detailed evaluation of
student ability that is part of the college application process. An example of school
groupings in the literature can be found in Fu (2012). In Fu’s example, only four-year
schools are addressed, which are subdivided into public and private groups. Within
each of those groups, Fu creates a sub-group of selective schools and unselective
(other) schools, yielding a total of four groups.3 Stratification based on public/private
status and other metrics of school quality were considered in our work, but dismissed
due to small sample size within each group. Adjustments of income expectations
based on students’ individual characteristics were not used for similar reasons.
This method of accounting for ability bias is superior to previously used methods
such as debiasing by grades or standardized test scores because it captures more in-
formation and is more readily available for college choice applications. This approach
3Selective schools are those in the top thirty of US News & World Report’s college rankings (U.S.
News and World Report, 2012).
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uses data that are common to all college applicants—information about where they
applied and were admitted—instead of requiring participation in a particular exam
or program that may not be offered to all potential college-goers. Additionally, col-
lege admissions staff are uniquely qualified to assess student ability given the large
amount of information submitted with an application. We believe that the decisions
of college admissions officers are likely to reflect intrinsic ability beyond differences
in test scores or grades. Results suggesting that college attended has no effect on
post-college income after adjusting for the top school admitted to are supported by
alternative models where math SAT score is used as a metric of student quality.4 For
example, figure 4.1 can be redrawn using math SAT score categories instead of top
admitted school selectivity categories. We treat the acceptance decision as exoge-
nous, assuming that students are generally admitted to schools which they are well
qualified to attend. Previous work by e.g. Dillon and Smith (2013) suggests that this
is a reasonable assumption. School grouping methods other than Barron’s selectivity
index were also investigated and Barron’s scores are supplemented with SAT score
percentiles and acceptance rates.5 We do not include individual characteristics such
as high school grades or location of residence in our model since this reduces sample
sizes within each group.6
There is some concern that school quality is endogenous, with school quality
determined by the quality of the student body. Our metric of school quality is based
on selectivity, directly linking school quality to the quality of students admitted. Such
endogeneity is not problematic for our work since we model individual level decisions.
Individual choices of attendance do not significantly affect the overall composition
4Math SAT score is a strong predictor of post-college income, as shown in table 4.3.
5In the sample of schools applied to by the students in this analysis, correlation between Barron’s
selectivity index and the percentage of applicants admitted is 52%. Correlation between Barron’s
and the student body’s 25th and 75th SAT score percentiles is −37% and −23%, respectively.
6Data on high school grades have high degrees of missingness. Regressions including location
of residence, verbal SAT score, and top school admitted reveal that categorical location dummies
and verbal SAT scores do not have a significant effect on post-college income after adjusting for top
school admitted to (p-value > 0.05).
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of the student body at a school. Additionally, our results support the hypothesis
that school quality is based on student quality, since students admitted to selective
schools perform well in terms of income even when they do not attend the selective
institutions. This suggests that the education received at a selective school may not
be superior to that at a different institution.
We do not explicitly model unemployment risk, graduation risk, or future tax
burdens. Instead, we account for this type of uncertainty by including all individuals
who begin education at a certain level in our sample, beginning with income earned
in the year after an on-time graduation. Thus, unemployment and graduation risk
are included since they affect the future income of each group. Currently available
income data from the NLSY 97 does not capture all unemployment risk or future
education decisions over the lifetime. As more data points are collected in the NLSY
97, we hope that more sophisticated income models can be developed, capturing
income levels and variance over the whole lifetime.
4.4.2 Potential criticisms and shortcomings of the NLSY 1997 data
The main challenges in writing this chapter are due to shortcomings in the avail-
able data. The short time period for which NLSY 97 data are available is a concern.
We are interested in studying the relationship between post-college income and school-
ing decisions, but we have only limited data on lifetime incomes. The latest NLSY 97
data are from 2010, and the 1984 cohort reached age eighteen (high school gradua-
tion) and age twenty-two (on-time college graduation) in 2002 and 2006, respectively.
Therefore, we have only about four years of post-college income data available for
those individuals who stayed in college for four years. As additional income data is
collected in the NLSY 97, income estimates can be improved, allowing us to study
income variance and the effect of individual characteristics more closely and over a
longer period.
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A further criticism may come from the fact that we examine only individuals
from a single cohort. As pointed out by Davis and von Wachter (2011), individuals
who graduate during a recession experience the repercussions of their inopportune
entrance into the working world for the duration of their career, lowering salary
expectations and utility of future income streams. Since we are primarily interested
in the substitution effect between schools (e.g. what makes a person pick school A
over school B), we believe that accurate modeling of the magnitude of future earnings
is less important than the relationship between salaries for those attending different
schools. It is not clear that graduation during a recession would significantly change
the relative factors leading a student to choose one school over another. Previous
cohorts of the NLSY did not include the college choice questions which provide the
data used in our models. Therefore, comparative analysis cannot be performed using
older cohorts.
We must make several assumptions in order to model the college choice portion of
the application/acceptance/attendance game in isolation. We assume that students’
application decisions reflect their ability as well as their desires about which school to
attend. Throughout the model, we treat the application decision as exogenous and
assume that students apply to the schools in which they are most interested. We also
assume that high ability students apply to selective institutions, even though they
may also apply to less selective schools, and that school’s supply side decisions such
as admissions and financial aid amounts are exogenous. While these assumptions
may be violated in a small number of cases, they reflect the usual behavior of college
applicants. Work by e.g. Dillon and Smith (2013) suggests that students generally
apply to schools for which they are qualified, though less wealthy students may fail to
apply to the highest quality schools given their ability levels. The number of schools





To understand the effect of educational choices on income, we compare raw post-
college income data across students of different ability levels and educational deci-
sions. Through this work, we build an understanding of the likely income level for
a student of a particular ability who makes a specific schooling decision. Table 4.2
presents results of fixed-effects regressions estimating post-college income based on
school attended and top school admitted to separately. Our results indicate that both
being admitted to top schools and attending top schools is correlated with higher in-
come levels. While school attended appears to be a more significant predictor of
post-college income than school admitted to, categorization of individuals by the se-
lectivity of school attended introduces sample bias since those students who are able
to attend top schools must have been admitted to these institutions. The question
we wish to answer is whether or not school attended has an effect on future income
after adjusting for intrinsic ability, which we measure by top school admitted to. We
test for the effect of admission within each attendance group separately as well as
the effect of attendance within each admission group separately, but find that sample
sizes in sub-groups are generally too small to draw definitive conclusions. The fixed
effects factor models are presented in appendix C.4.
We are able to identify some significant pairwise differences in income levels by
attendance decision within an admission category. Specifically, for students who
are admitted to a type 1 school, attendance at that type 1 school yields significantly
higher income than attendance at a type 2 or type 3 institution. Additionally, we show
that attending college at all is better than attending no college for students whose
top admitted school falls into categories 1, 3, and 4. These results are presented
in appendix C.5. Salary for non-attenders is not significantly different across top
56
Table 4.2: Predicted post-college income by selectivity of top school admitted to and
school attended.
(a) Predicted post-college income, by
top school admitted to. Type
1 indicates most selective schools.
avgIncome = α0 +α1topAdmit+ ε.
a,b,c
Fixed effects regression model
Adjusted R2: 0.0764
Estimate St. Error p-value
(Intercept) 39,457 2,122
Type 2 1,217 2,792 0.6631
Type 3 -8,845 2,501 0.0004
Type 4 -9,898 2,41 4.59x10−5
Types 5/6 -13,789 2,882 2.19x10−6
aBase case is type 1 (most selective).
bSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s
selectivity index, which measures the accep-
tance rate of students who have applied for
study (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are
combined into a single category. Specialty
schools (type 7) are omitted.
cSelected sample is presented in table 4.1
and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individu-
als included are those from the cross-sectional
sample who completed high school, partici-
pated in the college choice section of the sur-
vey, were admitted to at least one four-year
institution, and are not missing critical data.
(b) Predicted post-college income, by
school attended. Type 1 indicates most
selective schools. avgIncome = α0 +
α1attend + ε.
a,b,c
Fixed effects regression model
Adjusted R2: 0.1341
Estimate St. Error p-value
(Intercept) 25,256 1,375
Type 1 24,387 3,901 7.99x10−10
Type 2 22,800 2,987 9.81x10−14
Type 3 9,078 2,000 6.91x10−6
Type 4 7,015 1,786 9.60x10−5
Types 5/6 1,710 2,347 0.4670
aBase case is non-attenders.
bSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s
selectivity index, which measures the accep-
tance rate of students who have applied for
study (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are
combined into a single category. Specialty
schools (type 7) are omitted.
cSelected sample is presented in table 4.1
and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individu-
als included are those from the cross-sectional
sample who completed high school, partici-
pated in the college choice section of the sur-
vey, were admitted to at least one four-year
institution, and are not missing critical data.
admitted groups (p-value = 0.7422). However, consistent with above results, salary
of attenders differs across top admitted groups (p-value = 8.66x10−5). Figure 4.2
shows these differences; income for attenders is higher for those whose top admitted
school is more selective. The second panel in figure 4.2 examines whether there is
a significant difference in the benefit of attending school at all across top admitted
groups. We plot the difference between earnings of attenders and non-attenders for
each top admitted group with 95% confidence intervals, and see that these differences
are in fact indistinguishable across groups. This implies that the choice of whether
or not to attend school has a similar effect on future earnings across ability groups.
Overall, we are able to show that differences exist between those who attend school
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(a) Average post-college income for at-
tenders at any college, by top admitted
category. Error bars show 95% confi-
dence intervals on the mean. Type 1
indicates most selective schools.
(b) Differences in post-college income
for attenders versus non-attenders, by
top admitted category. Error bars
show 95% confidence intervals on the
difference. Type 1 indicates most se-
lective schools.
Figure 4.2: Average post-college earnings by selectivity of top school admitted to. No
significant differences exist in average earnings for non-attenders across top admitted
categories.a,b,c
aSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s selectivity index, which measures the acceptance rate
of students who have applied for study (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are combined into a single
category. Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted.
bSelected sample is presented in table 4.1 and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals included are those from the cross-sectional sample who
completed high school, participated in the college choice section of the survey, were admitted to at
least one four-year institution, and are not missing critical data.
cSignificant differences in lifetime earnings for attenders exist between the following top admitted
groups (p-values): Type 1 and type 3 (0.0092), type 1 and type 4 (0.0601), type 1 and type 5/6
(0.0005), type 2 and type 3 (0.0007), type 2 and type 4 (0.0091), type 2 and type 5/6 (5.1x10−5),
type 3 and type 5/6 (0.0906), and type 4 and type 5/6 (0.0189).
at all versus those who do not pursue higher education, and that incomes are higher
for those students who are admitted to an elite school and choose to attend it. Figure
4.3 summarizes these results by providing the best estimate of average post-college
income for each group. Post-college income is the same for all non-attenders. Income
is the same across different attendance decisions within each top admitted category
except for students admitted to top institutions. For these students, attendance at
the elite institution increases income.
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Figure 4.3: Best estimates of post-college income by selectivity of the best school
admitted to and attendance decision. Type 1 indicates most selective schools.a,b,c,d
aExpected college graduation is considered to be four years after the beginning of a college
education for those attending college, and four years after the start of the academic year for which
students applied to college for those not attending.
bSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s selectivity index, which measures the acceptance rate
of students who have applied for study (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are combined into a single
category. Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted.
cSelected sample is presented in table 4.1 and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals included are those from the cross-sectional sample who
completed high school, participated in the college choice section of the survey, were admitted to at
least one four-year institution, and are not missing critical data.
dOnly significant differences shown.
4.5.2 Effect of college attendance and other factors
Selectivity of the best school admitted to is not the only important predictor of
post-college income. We use the individual student data available in the NLSY 1997
to examine which other factors may affect income. As shown in table 4.3, we find
that mathematical ability (measured by math SAT score), household income, and
major choice have an effect on income. The top school admitted to is not a signifi-
cant predictor of income after adjusting for these student and family characteristics.
Students choosing majors in business and, especially, engineering exhibit consistently
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higher post-college salaries across admission groups. The positive income benefit from
majoring in engineering or business fields remains significant for students whose top
admitted school is of type 1 (p-value = 9.43x10−5) and for the subset of these individ-
uals who attend a type 1 school (p-value = 0.0077). We also investigate the impact
of gender, race, and location of residence, but find no significant effect from these.
We do not include the effect of income variance across groups in this model since we
do not have sufficient data to fully assess this variance. Income variance is highest
among students whose top admitted school is of type 1, but this may be driven by
the fact that these students have a wider range of attendance options. After adjust-
ing for top school admitted to, there is no significant difference in income variance
based on the school type attended. Income volatility should be analyzed further as
more income data is collected on NLSY 1997 respondents. Even with the inclusion of
student characteristics, this model does not explain a large portion of overall income
variance, suggesting that many other factors matter in determining income levels.
As stated in section 4.4, the samples used in this analysis include any student that
initially enrolled in a school of a given quality. Adjusting this sample to only students
that successfully graduate from institutions in each category reduces the sample size,
but suggests similar results. We also investigate the effect of attending the best school
one was admitted to versus a lower quality school, and find no difference in expected
earnings between these groups except for those admitted to type 1 schools.
4.5.3 Lifetime income
We expand on the analysis of raw income data by developing a model of the
expected value of the future lifetime income stream that results from attending a
school with a particular selectivity type. The goal of this analysis is to provide an
illustrative example of future work that may be performed as more income data is
collected from the NLSY 97. We project the shape of each individual’s most likely
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Estimate St. Error p-value
(Intercept) 10,790 3,897
Math SAT score 2,876 879 0.0011
Household income 0.0320 0.0130 0.0142
Engineering/business indicator 10,300 2,039 6.33x10−7
Humanities/arts indicator -4,003 2,258 0.0769
aSelected sample is presented in table 4.1 and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals included are those from the cross-sectional sample who
completed high school, participated in the college choice section of the survey, were admitted to at
least one four-year institution, and are not missing critical data. The sample in this table excludes
individuals for whom regression data is missing. Math SAT scores are missing for about one third
of the students in our sample, reducing the sample size for this model. A model using top school
admitted to instead of top math SAT score gives similar results with worse fit.
bMajor choice is based on the initial program decision made upon entering college. It does not
necessarily reflect the final major in which a degree was attained, since some students change majors
or do not complete their studies. Engineering/business majors include engineering, business, and
computer-related fields. Social sciences/arts includes social sciences such as psychology, archeology,
education, political science, sociology, and theology as well as fine arts studies.
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labor income curve over the lifetime. Income estimates are based on employment
status, school enrollment status, and employment income reported in the NLSY 97.
All reported employment income is used, so long as students claim full-time working
status and report at least 12,000 hour of employment and at least $10,000 of labor
income in a given year. The salary lower bound helps reduce noise in the data caused
by unusual employment situations such as unpaid internships, volunteer work, or
career training. Income from years of unemployment or severe under-employment is
not used in the estimation of the shape of the lifetime income curve.7
To extrapolate from the early career income data provided in NLSY 97 to the
expected lifetime income curve for the students in our sample, we supplement NLSY
97 data with current synthetic work-life earnings projections from the US Census
Bureau (Census Bureau, 2012). Synthetic earnings estimates are adjusted by level of
education received (Dya and Newburger, 2002). The method described in this section
allows us to gain maximal insight into future earnings by
• using all income data points available for a particular individual,
• taking advantage of information about the shape of lifetime income curves from
US Census data,
• accounting for differences in the number of years worked between those who
attend college and those who do not, and
• accounting for earnings over the whole lifecycle instead of taking the net present
value of only the available data points.
7Income projection was also performed without the $10,000 upper bound, without restrictions
on full-time employment status, and allowing use of income from sources such as unemployment
insurance and investments. The approach used here was chosen because it maximizes the number
of individuals for whom income projection is possible. The result that income parameters do not
vary across school type attended after adjusting for the top attended school is consistent across all
projection approaches.
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This supplements the analysis of raw data explained in the previous section, and es-
tablishes a model for future analysis to be performed as more income data is collected.
Analysis of our lifetime income projections yields results similar to those found in the
raw data, suggesting that student ability rather than schooling decisions drive differ-
ences in income. Unfortunately, the data requirements for the projection technique
used here require us to drop a significant portion of the original sample. Analysis
performed using lifetime income estimates include a sample of only 525 individuals
who provide sufficient income data for projection. This sample is presented in table
4.4.
Table 4.4: Number of students in sample, by attendance and admission groups. Type
1 indicates most selective schools.a,b
Selectivity of school attended
More selective Less selective
1 2 3 4 5,6 Non-attenders Total
More 1 15 8 11 9 0 7 50
Best selective 2 15 24 16 3 8 66
school 3 77 35 11 24 147
admitted Less 4 123 13 57 193
selective 5,6 40 29 69
Total 15 23 112 183 67 125 525
aSample is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals
included are those from the cross-sectional sample who completed high school, participated in the
college choice section of the survey, were admitted to at least one four-year institution, and are not
missing critical data, including income data required for lifecycle income projection.
bSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s selectivity index (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are
combined into a single category. Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted.
As we reduce our sample from the complete set of NLSY 97 respondents, we ensure
that the original demographics of our data are preserved. Students with very few data
points are removed from the sample, and we must ensure that this does not introduce
severe bias. Students with fewer post-college income data points may include high
caliber students who attend graduate school or pursue unpaid learning opportunities
as well as lower ability students who take longer to complete college or have very low
paying jobs. As shown in table 4.5, we find that the rate of data deletion is similar
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across attendance and admission groups.
Table 4.5: Percentage of selected NLSY 1997 sample used in analysis, by attendance
and admission groups. Individuals removed from sample do not report sufficient
income data points. Type 1 indicates most selective schools.a,b
Selectivity of school attended
More selective Less selective
1 2 3 4 5,6 Non-attenders Total
More 1 35% 36% 41% 50% NA 44% 40%
Best selective 2 25% 47% 53% 43% 38% 39%
school 3 48% 52% 58% 38% 48%
admitted Less 4 51% 50% 50% 51%
selective 5,6 51% 55% 53%
Total 35% 28% 47% 52% 52% 46% 46%
aSelected sample is presented in table 4.1 and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals included are those from the cross-sectional sample who
completed high school, participated in the college choice section of the survey, were admitted to at
least one four-year institution, and are not missing critical data.
bSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s selectivity index (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are
combined into a single category. Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted.
Lifetime income estimates are created by fitting a restricted Nelson-Siegel equation
to synthetic lifetime earnings curves created by the US Census Bureau.8 We then
calibrate the model, estimating a single shape parameter for each individual in our
sample that captures the likely shape of his or her lifetime income curve. We study
differences in income across student ability and school quality groups by comparing
these shape parameters and the lifetime income they imply. Details of this analysis
are provided in appendix C.3, and results confirm the hypothesis that the selectivity
of the school attended does not affect income after adjusting for selectivity of the
top school admitted to. As more data is collected from the NLSY 97 survey, more
sophisticated income projection methods may allow for further study of the effects of
lifetime income levels and variance.
8See Nelson and Siegel (1987). The Nelson-Siegel equation is commonly used to model yield
curves.
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4.6 Drivers of college choice
We fail to show that there is a difference in post-college income based on selectivity
of the school attended after adjusting for the selectivity level of the top school a
student is admitted to. This result from the previous section implies that we cannot
test for the effect of future income on the schooling decision in general, since the
schooling decision has no sizable impact on future income. We can test for the effect
of elite institution status, since students attending elite institutions exhibit higher
salaries. In this section, we test which other factors affect the way students make
decisions about whether and where to attend college. We see that concerns about
school quality and selectivity as well as monetary interests are key drivers of the
decision, even though school quality does not appear to predict post-college earnings
in most cases. School quality is important to students outside of elite school status,
and elite status alone does not appear to affect schooling decisions.
Candidate drivers consist of individual, school, and interaction characteristics.
School characteristics include list tuition, financial aid including in-state residency
discounts, instructional spending per student, public versus private status, financial
aid received by the student body, school size, and the student body gender ratio. In-
dividual characteristics include student gender, ethnicity, parents’ educational attain-
ment, household size and income, and high school type. Interaction terms compare
the most preferred school’s selectivity to that of the student’s top admitted school,
examine urban versus rural status of the student’s home and school, and capture
distance between home and the college campus.
The college decision is broken down into two components: First, we use a bi-
nary logistic model to capture the decision of whether or not to attend college at all.
Second, we use a conditional logistic model to determine factors important in choos-
ing between colleges for those students that in fact do attend school.9 Additional
9We use R to construct all models. First stage binary logit models are estimated using the glm
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background on binary and conditional logistic choice models is provided in appendix
C.6.
4.6.1 Choice of attendance: The first stage binary logit model
The first decision in the college choice process is the decision of whether or not
to attend college at all. The first stage input dataset contains one entry per student
which stores individual characteristics, information about the most preferred school
admitted to, and interaction terms quantifying the fit of the student at this school.
For students attending college, the most preferred school admitted to is the school
attended. For students that do not attend school, we use the predicted utility of
each candidate school from the second stage model to determine which school is the
most preferred (see table 4.7 below for the second stage model). The second stage
model is estimated first, allowing us to derive an equation for the utility of attendance
at a particular school for a particular person. Once this equation is known, we can
determine which of the possible schooling options facing each non-attender would have
provided them with the highest utility. This school is used as the most preferred school
for non-attenders in the first stage model. This method assumes that non-attenders
have similar preferences over school characteristics as attenders, even though not
attending is the highest utility option for non-attenders.
In the first stage of the model, we are able to include both individual and school
characteristics, since each choice situation is defined by a particular student and
his or her most preferred school. Individual student data include student ability
measured by the selectivity level of the top school admitted to, gender, ethnicity,
parents’ education, household size, and wealth. We convert the categorical data on
the selectivity of the top admitted school to a continuous variable by replacing each
Barron’s category with the acceptance rate with which it is associated. For example,
package, while second stage conditional choice models are constructed using the mclogit package
and clogit function from the survival package (R Core Team, 2013; Therneau, 2013; Elff, 2013).
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a type 1 school is measured as having an acceptance rate of 33%. This reduces
the impact of small sample size by reducing the number of parameters that must
be estimated. We call this continuous version of admitted school selectivity “top
admitted school acceptance rate.” We do not include the expected earnings premium
associated with college attendance in our model, since we have shown in the previous
section that this is the same across students. Previous work suggests that differences
in the expected college wage premiums would have an effect on enrollment probability
if they were significant, as in e.g. Dillon (2012) who shows that changes in the college
premium over time have an effect on enrollment probability. We also test for the
significance of higher order terms and likely interactions between variables.
The probability of attending college at all given that the most preferred school is















Model coefficients are provided in table 4.6.
We find that student ability (the top school admitted to) is a strong predictor
of college attendance, with students admitted to schools with low acceptance rates
(high selectivity) being more likely to attend college. After conditioning on student
ability, only a few variables provide additional explanatory power. Graduation rate
is highly correlated with other metrics of school quality, including selectivity, list
tuition, average faculty salary, and private versus public control status. While it is
not clear that students making the college decision focus explicitly on the graduation
rate of the school they are considering, the significance of this variable captures
students’ assessment of the overall quality of the institution. Graduation rate is
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Estimate St. Error p-value
(Intercept) -1.2100 1.0900
Top admitted school acceptance rated -0.0180 0.0060 0.0028
Graduation ratee 2.0543 0.5835 0.0004
aSelected sample is presented in table 4.1 and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals included are those from the cross-sectional sample who
completed high school, participated in the college choice section of the survey, were admitted to at
least one four-year institution, and are not missing critical data.
bMcFadden’s R2 = 1 − ln(L̂full)
ln(L̂intercept)
where L̂full gives the estimated likelihood of the model with
predictors and L̂intercept gives the estimated likelihood of the intercept-only model.
cAkaike Information Criterion, see e.g. Akaike (1969).
dTo limit the effects of small sample size, we change the categorical data on attendance and ad-
mission to interval data based on the admission criteria of schools within each category. Specifically,
using documentation on Barron’s selectivity index, we categorize selectivity groups based on the
acceptance rate of applicants. Type 1 schools have acceptance rates of at most 33% while type 5
and 6 schools admit 100% of their applicants.
eGraduation rate as reported in IPEDS. Graduation rate is highly correlated with other measures
of school quality, such as faculty salary, expenditures, and selectivity.
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treated here as an exogenous characteristic of the school in question, even though
quality of student body is clearly determined by institutional policies. A study of
the supply-side decisions that affect graduation rate is outside of the scope of this
work, and we treat it as a set characteristic of each institution. The high level of
significance of this variable suggests that the likelihood of attendance is affected by
student ability and the quality of the top school they were admitted to even within
the top admitted groups defined using Barron’s selectivity index. As shown in the
next section, students tend to prefer schools that perform highly on quality metrics
relative to other schools in their choice set. In this model, we see that having such a
high quality school available as a possible choice makes it more likely for a student to
attend school. Gender was also a significant predictor of attendance in preliminary
models, with females being slightly more likely to attend college than males.
Overall, the model in table 4.6 does not explain very much of the variance in
the college attendance decision, and does not successfully predict whether or not a
student will attend school. Student and school quality appear to be the primary
drivers of attendance, and other variables fail to provide additional information on
attendance probability after adjusting for these factors.
This model closely parallels the work of Long (2004b) and allows us to update
Long’s models using a more recent cohort of the NLSY. Comparison to Long’s work
provides some context for our study and lets us verify consistency with the literature.
Long studies changes in the factors affecting college attendance and the choice between
schools over time, studying data from the high school graduating classes of 1972, 1982,
and 1992. Our work adds a new set of models for the high school graduating class of
circa 2002. Comparing our first stage model to the attendance decision model for 1992
graduates in Long (2004b), we find that our model provides more significant predictors
of college attendance. Additionally, the variables which predict attendance in our
model are not candidate variables in Long’s work. Attempting to recreate Long’s
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model with our data yields models with largely insignificant parameters. Where
significant, signs are generally consistent with Long’s original model. These results
are presented in appendix C.7. Both Long’s original models and the model presented
in this section fail to capture the majority of variance of the binary college attendance
decision. Long finds that tuition price became less important in the attendance
decision between 1972 and 1992. Our analysis confirms these findings, as tuition is
not a significant predictor of attendance in the first stage model in table 4.6.
4.6.2 Choice between colleges: The second stage conditional logit model
The second stage of our model captures the choice between colleges given that an
individual has decided to attend school at all. In this model, alternatives are defined
entirely by school characteristics, allowing us to include specific details about each of
the colleges represented in our sample. School characteristics include price informa-
tion, financial aid availability, student body characteristics, school wealth, and school
quality metrics including an indicator for elite (type 1) school status. The data in-
clude one sample point for each student/school combination. Data are stratified by
student, with each student’s stratum including one set of data per alternative school
considered. The likelihood of selecting a particular school is calculated relative to the
other schools in a specific student’s choice group, meaning that we cannot account
for individual characteristics in this portion of the model. This means that we cannot
adjust explicitly for student ability (top school admitted to), since this parameter
is constant across a choice situation (for a given student). However, we can include
student ability information through the use of interaction effects. Selectivity differ-
ence captures the difference between the selectivity level of the top school to which a
student was admitted and the selectivity of the current candidate school, providing
a metric of whether a school is a “stretch” or “safety” choice for the particular stu-
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dent.10 We also test for the significance of an elite school indicator, since we show
that attendance at elite (type 1) schools provides a unique income benefit. Other
interaction terms we consider include distance between a student’s home and the col-
lege and the proportion of tuition that is covered by financial aid. It is this portion of
the model that makes significant use of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA) property, which states that the relative utility of schools in the choice set does
not change mathematically if some alternative schools fail to be included in the sam-
ple. Additional details on the IIA property and logistic choice models are provided
in appendix C.6.
Since our data on school characteristics are very rich, we begin by examining
collinearity between school characteristics that may measure similar traits. As men-
tioned in the previous section, graduation rate is highly correlated with other metrics
of school quality. Our sample also includes several variables that measure expendi-
tures, tuition and net cost, and federal aid access. Given the interrelatedness of some
variables, we develop a robust method of model selection for the second stage model.
We investigate candidate models that include all combinations of variables predicting
tuition and net cost, selectivity, expenditures and wealth, and school quality, selecting
the combination of variables that yields the best fit. Appendix C.8 provides more de-
tails on pre-estimation analysis of the relationships between predictors and the model
selection process. Models using alternate configurations of related predictor variables
(e.g. list tuition and aid amounts instead of net tuition) generate similar results. We
also investigate the use of higher order and interaction terms.
We find that net tuition and school quality as measured by graduation rate predict
the likelihood of choosing a particular institution. Net tuition is calculated by sub-
tracting financial aid from list out-of-state tuition. Financial aid includes the in-state
discount, if it applies, financial aid awarded by the school, and financial aid awarded
10Selectivity difference = selectivity of this schooling option - selectivity of the top school admitted
to.
71
by other sources for use at this school or any school attended. Students prefer less
expensive schooling. Alternative models that include both list tuition and financial
aid amounts also support this hypothesis. We do not find any evidence that higher
list tuition with more aid is preferred to lower list tuition. Graduation rate is a metric
of school quality, and is highly correlated with related variables such as faculty salary,
instructional spending, and selectivity. The significance of this set of variables implies
that students prefer the highest quality schools in their choice portfolio. An indicator
for elite (type 1) status of an institution is not significant after including graduation
rate, suggesting that the preference for higher quality institutions is not driven by the
income benefit associated with attendance at elite institutions. The preference for
higher quality institutions exists across top admitted groups, even for students who
should not expect an income benefit from attendance at a higher quality institution.















Model coefficients are provided in table 4.7. As described in the previous section,
this model is also used to predict which of their candidate schools each non-attender
would most prefer. This information is used as an input in the first stage model.
The second stage model has more explanatory power than the first stage model,
but still fails to capture all of the variance in the choice between schools. As with the
first stage model, we see that school quality plays a key role, with students picking
higher quality institutions within their choice sets. This is countered by a desire to
pay a lower tuition price, and decisions are likely a trade-off between these two main
drivers. The first stage model shows that higher ability students are more likely to
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Estimate St. Error p-value
Net tuitionc -6.59x10−5 1.07x10−5 6.11x10−10
(Net tuition)2 -9.11x10−10 3.17x10−10 4.06x10−3
Graduation rated 2.52 0.566 8.40x10−6
aSelected sample is presented in table 4.1 and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals included are those from the cross-sectional sample who
completed high school, participated in the college choice section of the survey, were admitted to at
least one four-year institution, and are not missing critical data.
bMcFadden’s R2 = 1 − ln(L̂full)
ln(L̂intercept)
where L̂full gives the estimated likelihood of the model with
predictors and L̂intercept gives the estimated likelihood of the intercept-only model.
cNet tuition is calculated as list out-of-state tuition price minus financial aid. Financial aid
includes financial aid awarded for attending the particular school in question, financial aid for use
at all schools, and the in-state tuition discount.
dGraduation rate as reported in IPEDS. Graduation rate is highly correlated with other measures
of school quality, such as faculty salary, expenditures, and selectivity.
attend school. In the second stage model, we see that students tend to select the
higher quality institutions within their choice set across student ability categories.
As with the first stage model, we compare our model to that presented for 1992
graduates in Long (2004b). The model in table 4.7 does not fit the data as well as
Long’s model, likely due to the smaller size of our sample. However, we do find that
related variables have signs consistent with Long’s model. Results from an attempt
to recreate Long’s original model with our data are presented in appendix C.7.
4.7 Conclusions
The models presented in this work provide evidence for the hypothesis that post-
college labor income is driven primarily by individual characteristics and major rather
than institutional choice. The unique data available through the college choice in-
terview section of the NLSY 1997 allow us to study income differences using a new
debiasing method. The method of debiasing introduced in this chapter accounts for
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differences in ability levels across groups of students attending schools of varying
selectivity by conditioning on the selectivity of the best school an individual was ad-
mitted to. With the exception of the decision to attend college at all, attendance at
an elite (type 1) institution, and major choice, we fail to show significant differences
in income based on schooling decisions. Earnings expectations are improved by the
decision to attend college at all. Earnings for those who do not attend any college
are the same across top admitted categories, while earnings for attenders are highest
for those admitted to top schools. The difference in salary between attenders versus
non-attenders is the same across top admitted categories. Engineering, business, and
computer-related majors offer a wage premium while humanities and arts majors ex-
hibit lower salaries even after adjusting for ability. This suggests that wage increases
are not simply due to students of different abilities self-selecting into these majors.
Even though school quality does not appear to have a strong effect on post-
college income for most groups, it is a primary driver of school choice. The decision
to attend school at all is driven by student quality (measured by the top school
admitted to) and the quality of the most-preferred (top choice) school to which a
student was admitted (measured by graduation rate). Increased cost of schooling
decreases the likelihood of selecting a particular school, while school quality (measured
by graduation rate) increases the likelihood of attending that school. School quality
is therefore important in both portions of the college decision process (attendance
and choice between schools), even though there is no obvious income benefit related
to quality outside of students choosing to attend an elite (type 1) institution. The
schooling decision is a tradeoff between desires for attendance at a more selective and
a cheaper institution, yet the benefit of paying for increased selectivity is unclear.
74
4.8 Future work
The primary challenges in the development of the models presented here are small
sample size and the lack of a long time series of income information for each student.
As the NLSY 1997 continues to be administered and more interview data are col-
lected, our model can be updated to reflect additional income information. As NLSY
1997 respondents continue to report income data, educational outcomes, and attained
degrees, projection methods similar to the one presented in section 4.5.3 could be used
to create a model that focuses on income across the whole lifetime, modeling difference
in income curve shape as well as income variance between admission and attendance
groups. Additionally, income differences based on institutional choices may exist for
particular subsets of the population (such as a particular major). These differences
could be included in the choice models, modeling schooling decisions as selection
between future income streams.
Recently, several groups have suggested the use of sophisticated risk-adjusted
lifecycle choice models for evaluating returns to higher education. In a lifecycle choice
model, employment and savings decisions are made over time, and the expected value
and variance of future income is used to determine the worth of income streams
resulting from a particular educational choice. The lifecycle choice approach can be
applied to the school choice problem by viewing school choice as selection between
different risky income streams and estimating empirically the income dynamics for
each possible choice. As more data are collected as part of NLSY 1997, it will become
possible to estimate the necessary dynamics of realized an hypothetical future income
streams for each individual and each educational choice they face.
The lifecycle choice model was introduced in two seminal papers by Robert C.
Merton (Merton, 1969, 1971). Individuals face a risky future income stream and
must make savings and consumption decisions so as to maximize their overall lifetime
consumption. More complex version of Merton’s models include multiple hedging
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assets, incomplete markets, multiple sources of income uncertainty, and a variety of
other adjustments that must in many cases be solved numerically or iteratively (see
e.g. Gourinchas and Parker (1999), Henderson (2005), and Carroll (2004)). Early
papers applying these lifecycle choice models to questions in higher education include
work by Brown et al. (2012) and Bhuller et al. (2011). Brown et al. (2012) show that
proper adjustment for income risk over the lifetime reduces estimates of the benefit
of college education. Bhuller et al. (2011) model differences in the lifetime earnings
curve based on different levels of education, pointing out that lifecycle bias arises
if post-graduation income is used as a proxy for all future earnings. Cocco et al.
(1998) study the effect of human capital and education on investment and savings
decisions throughout the lifecycle, examining the impact of credit constraints and
labor income uncertainty. As new data become available, the current model will
benefit from increased sample size and more information about earnings differences
between groups.
A second natural extension of this work is a more in-depth study of non-income
drivers of the college decision. Since we find that income is not significantly affected
by school choice except for students choosing to attend elite colleges, it is somewhat
surprising to see that school quality metrics such as graduation rate and faculty salary
are the main drivers of institutional choice even for those not facing the choice of
attendance at an elite institution. Future research should investigate whether these
are indeed the true drivers of students’ decisions, or whether a perceived boost in




This dissertation tackles three important questions related to higher education
markets and the role of monetary factors and financial aid in these markets. Chap-
ter II provides context for a more thorough examination of US higher education by
studying the role of public and private funding in twelve countries in North America
and Europe. Chapter III looks at the effect of financial factors on the supply and
demand balance in the US higher education market, studying drivers of enrollment
on both sides. Finally, chapter IV provides a glimpse into the individual-level college
choice process, helping us understand whether and how financial considerations play
into student decisions.
The US higher education market function quite differently from most Western
European systems. In the United States, most institutions of higher education expect
students to pay tuition and fees with private funds, though aid is often available. In
many European countries, government subsidies have eliminated or severly reduced
tuition and fees for tertiary studies, with students and families responsible for only
small enrollment fees, living expenses, and specialty program charges. Throughout
the Western world, governments are interested in providing high quality education
to as many qualified students as possible. In addition to developing a well-educated
workforce, high quality universities attract foreign talent, funding, and businesses.
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The study presented in chapter II examines drivers of higher education enrollment,
and finds that overall wealth (measured by GDP) is the primary driver of enrollment
changes. Especially in countries like the United States, where private funds form
the basis for educational spending, GDP increases are translated quite directly into
increased enrollment at institutions of higher education. We do not see significant
differences in the effect of GDP on enrollments as a result of recent European reforms,
most of which lead to increased privatization and autonomy in the higher education
market.
The United States government has reacted to the problem of ever increasing tu-
ition prices by vastly expanding its federal financial aid programs. Private aid has
also grown, and individual institutions are stepping up their support through scholar-
ships, tuition waivers, work study, and discounts. Chapter III presents a macro-level
analysis of supply and demand in the changing higher education market from 1976
through 2007. We find that financial factors are important on both the supply and
demand sides. Revenue and cost concerns appear to drive supply-side (institutional)
decisions, while students focus on post-college benefit of higher education and debt
levels. We find support for the hypothesis that schools are incentivised to continually
increase spending, though increased debt aversion amongst consumers may lead to
increased price sensitivity.
Concerns about college affordability are becoming more pervasive in individual
decisions about higher education. In chapter IV, we study the factors driving the
college attendance and school choice decisions, with a focus on the effect of future
income. We find that affordability is a primary decision driver, with college quality
providing a significant counter-force to the desire to attend an affordable institution.
However, we do not see that attendance at a higher quality institution translates
directly into higher post-college earnings except for students who attend top schools.
Student ability and major choice appear to drive post-college income even after ad-
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justing for ability differences, suggesting that the choice of major has a bigger effect
on income expectations than the choice of school for most students. As more income
data are collected on the individuals studied in this chapter, increasingly sophisti-
cated models of income expectations over the lifetime will allow us to develop further





Appendices for Chapter II: Higher education
funding in the Western world
A.1 Starting point for alternate models
This appendix provides two alternate baseline models considered during analysis.
These models use population (table A.1) and spending (table A.2) instead of GDP
to construct the baseline relationship between country size and enrollment. Models
developed from these starting points produce results very similar to those presented
in the main analysis of chapter II. Note that the portion of both spending and
population that is correlated with GDP provides most of the predictive power.
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Table A.1: Effect of population correlated and uncorrelated with GDP on new enroll-
ment. newEnrollmenti,t = β0uncorrelatedPopulationi,t + β1correlatedPopulationi,t.
a,b
Ordinary least squares regression
Adjusted R2 0.3352
Variablec Coefficient value St. error p-value
(Intercept) 2905.1 2506.7
Population uncorr. w. GDP -916.8 664.3 0.17
Population corr. w. GDP 18087.5 2262.3 6.38x10−13
aPopulation is broken out into components that are correlated and uncorrelated with GDP. The
portion of population correlated with GDP measures increases in wealth associated with population
growth.
bData include yearly GDP, population, and enrollment figures for countries listed in table 2.1
from 1997 to 2008.
cFor detailed variable descriptions see table 2.2.
Table A.2: Effect of spending on tertiary education correlated and uncorrelated
with GDP on new enrollment. newEnrollmenti,t = β0uncorrelatedSpendingi,t +
β1correlatedSpendingi,t.
a,b
Ordinary least squares regression
Adjusted R2 0.3032
Variablec Coefficient value St. error p-value
(Intercept) 1058.2 2680.9
Spending uncorr. w. GDP -2013.2 809.6 0.01
Spending corr. w. GDP 7643.4 997.1 3.77x10−12
aSpending is broken out into components that are correlated and uncorrelated with GDP. The
portion of spending correlated with GDP measures increases in tertiary education spending that are
related to population growth.
bData include yearly GDP, population, and enrollment figures for countries listed in table 2.1
from 1997 to 2008.
cFor detailed variable descriptions see table 2.2.
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APPENDIX B
Appendices for Chapter III: The effect of credit
growth and financial aid on college tuition and fees
B.1 Final model residual plots
This appendix provides plots of residuals over time for the final models in tables
3.4 and 3.5 that make both the two-stage least squares adjustment for endogeneity
of net tuition price and the AR(1) autoregressive error term adjustment for het-
eroskedasticity. These plots do not show the second stage model residuals Y and
W but rather the white noise terms from the autoregressive equation for estimation
of residuals, eD and eS, as seen in equations (3.2) and (3.3). Heteroskedasticity is
dramatically reduced, with errors appearing to be white noise.
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(a) Supply model.a,b
aModel is provided in table 3.4.
bThis plots does not show the second
stage supply model residuals Y but rather
the white noise term from the autoregressive
equation for estimation of residuals, eS , as
seen in equation (3.2).
(b) Demand model.a,b
aModel is provided in table 3.5.
bThis plot does not show the second stage
demand model residuals W but rather the
white noise term from the autoregressive
equation for estimation of residuals, eD, as
seen in equation (3.3).
Figure B.1: Residuals over time, final models in tables 3.4 and 3.5.
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B.2 Demand model with offerings change tuition component
In the model below, we examine the effect of the component of net tuition that is
uncorrelated with the cost of operations (HEPI index). We refer to this as offerings
change, since it measures tuition fluctuations caused by changes in offerings to stu-
dents, meaning changes in service level or quality of the educational experience. We
see that new offerings increase demand. The component of tuition perfectly correlated
with the cost of operations appears to have no effect.
Table B.1: Demand model, offerings change only (enrollment per high school gradu-
ate).a,b
Two-stage least squares regression
Correlation (model estimates vs. actual) 0.56
Exclusion restrictions Test statistic p-value
Sargan 4.8347 0.0892
Basmann 4.6194 0.0993
Variable Coefficient value St. error p-value
(Intercept) 0.0031 0.0173
Benefit of college 0.0230 0.0201 0.2624
Credit effects per student -0.1478 0.0489 0.0055
Offerings change per studentc 0.0022 0.0012 0.0640
aModel equation is given in equation (3.2), with net tution per student replaced by offerings
change per student.
bFor detailed variable descriptions see table 3.1.
cOfferings change refers to the portion of net tuition that is uncorrelated with the cost of op-
erations of schools, as measured by the HEPI index. This measures changes in tuition caused by
changes in offerings to students instead of price increases for services already being offered.
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B.3 Main dataset
This appendix provides the input dataset for all models described in chapter III.
Note that not all variables are included in the final models. The data provided here
are extrapolated from publicly available data as indicated in footnotes. These data
points have not been detrended according to equation (3.1).
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Table B.2: Main dataset































$ Thousand $ Thousand $ Thousand $
1976 2.645 59.65 8,388.06 109.18 5.850 0.548
1977 2.680 63.60 8,410.72 110.34 5.362 0.580
1978 2.681 68.10 8,433.38 107.04 4.942 0.610
1979 2.763 74.00 8,456.04 101.41 4.486 0.598
1980 2.909 81.65 8,478.70 98.13 3.979 0.557
1981 2.997 89.85 8,655.86 98.97 3.663 0.555
1982 3.091 96.95 8,987.53 95.56 3.573 0.591
1983 3.242 102.40 9,319.20 109.52 3.631 0.637
1984 3.288 107.80 9,650.86 118.98 3.551 0.693
1985 3.362 113.55 9,982.53 122.93 3.630 0.736
1986 3.397 118.60 10,385.20 151.39 3.970 0.773
1987 3.377 123.55 10,699.16 177.90 4.300 0.786
1988 3.431 129.50 10,855.76 183.87 4.827 0.786
1989 3.668 136.80 10,957.11 182.90 5.312 0.772
1990 3.929 144.50 11,021.73 186.48 5.596 0.760
1991 4.168 150.85 11,054.75 183.60 6.017 0.745
1992 4.210 155.70 11,146.74 184.41 6.483 0.762
1993 4.187 160.60 11,422.95 197.98 7.016 0.788
1994 4.153 165.70 11,750.52 213.88 7.711 0.811
1995 4.103 170.55 11,991.40 231.88 8.298 0.857
1996 4.086 175.70 12,217.89 269.77 8.984 0.920
1997 3.993 181.55 12,581.53 324.67 9.984 1.010
1998 3.917 186.90 13,097.61 381.26 11.325 1.112
1999 3.914 193.00 13,664.01 421.41 12.834 1.196
2000 3.967 201.70 14,336.99 496.26 14.033 1.222
2001 4.089 210.75 15,030.70 541.76 15.725 1.154
2002 4.164 218.10 15,707.21 514.57 18.665 1.071
2003 4.181 226.35 16,499.41 512.24 21.227 1.028
2004 4.221 235.65 17,353.85 558.92 22.627 1.018
2005 4.235 245.80 18,270.53 625.43 23.956 1.040
2006 4.195 256.05 19,249.45 695.85 25.623 1.069
2007 4.171 266.75 20,290.60 800.92 27.417 1.073
aNational Center for Education Statistics (2008), Table 219.
bNational Center for Education Statistics (2008), Table 31, Commonfund Institute (2009).
cNational Center for Education Statistics (2008), Table 360.
dWe assume linear growth between 1976-1979 and 1981-1984. 1997-2001 values are based on regression estimation
from public expenditures. We assume quadratic growth 2002-2007 based on best fit from historical data.
eHarvard University Office of the Provost (2009), Yale University Office of Institutional Research (2009).
fHarvard endowment values 1975-1977 assume linear growth at the same rate as 1978-82, and Harvard enrollment
1975-87 assume linear growth at 1988-91 rate. Harvard and Yale are used because their investment models are used
by other schools and for data availability reasons.
gYale University Office of Institutional Research (2009).
hWe assume Yale endowment 1976-1987 values grow linearly at same rate as 1988-1992. Yale and Harvard values
are used because their investment models are used by other schools and for data availability reasons.
iNational Center for Education Statistics (2008), Table 358.
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Table B.3: Main dataset (continued)
Category Financial aid
to schools



























1976 4,444 6,091 0.147 0.077 173.14
1977 4,520 6,253 0.153 0.071 185.64
1978 4,543 6,013 0.159 0.061 203.08
1979 4,528 6,039 0.166 0.058 207.10
1980 4,417 6,000 0.171 0.071 192.10
1981 4,303 5,868 0.176 0.076 183.93
1982 4,245 6,053 0.181 0.097 179.68
1983 4,350 6,440 0.186 0.096 189.71
1984 4,561 6,407 0.190 0.075 208.94
1985 4,843 7,288 0.194 0.072 236.70
1986 5,114 7,729 0.195 0.070 255.41
1987 5,258 7,545 0.200 0.062 262.77
1988 5,419 7,727 0.205 0.055 271.84
1989 5,556 8,265 0.212 0.053 275.13
1990 5,564 7,917 0.213 0.056 275.73
1991 5,575 6,975 0.214 0.068 268.27
1992 5,629 7,096 0.215 0.075 272.11
1993 5,648 7,797 0.219 0.069 282.43
1994 5,753 7,887 0.224 0.061 296.49
1995 5,835 7,524 0.231 0.056 308.35
1996 5,867 7,976 0.236 0.054 315.77
1997 6,000 8,401 0.240 0.049 322.49
1998 6,247 9,034 0.246 0.045 339.49
1999 6,555 9,297 0.253 0.042 351.91
2000 7,011 9,917 0.257 0.040 361.34
2001 7,511 9,779 0.262 0.047 368.71
2002 7,956 9,573 0.269 0.058 383.78
2003 8,307 9,380 0.273 0.060 406.94
2004 8,492 9,283 0.277 0.055 430.64
2005 8,470 9,632 0.277 0.051 455.65
2006 8,479 9,542 0.282 0.046 478.02
2007 8,505 9,283 0.289 0.046 481.68
aNational Center for Education Statistics (2008), Tables 348, 349, 353.
bValues in 2001-2003 are based on the sum of support for public and private schools reported in Digest of Education
Statistics Tables 349 and 350. We assume linear growth rate in the percentage of financial aid going to public schools
from 2004 to 2007. We assume linear growth in 2007 based on observations from 2004 to 2006.
cUS Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009), Table A-3. Mean Earnings of Workers 18 Years and
Over, by Educational Attainment, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex (1975 to 2007).
dNational Center for Education Statistics (2008), Table 8, US Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2009).
eWe assume linear growth during 1976-1979 and 1981-1984.
fUS Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009).
gUS Federal Reserve (2009), Table D.3.
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Table B.4: Main dataset (continued)
Category Household wealth Financial aid to students





















Unit $ Index value
in 1983=100
$ $ $
1976 10,496 1.46 3,160 373.12 72.42
1977 10,749 1.41 3,648 404.48 83.82
1978 11,074 1.35 4,281 474.85 83.38
1979 10,959 1.25 5,773 592.27 84.93
1980 10,672 1.13 7,643 760.59 84.60
1981 10,700 1.05 7,817 857.48 75.53
1982 10,767 1.01 6,986 814.11 66.40
1983 11,140 1.00 7,763 804.56 66.01
1984 11,773 0.99 8,379 901.61 67.03
1985 11,999 0.97 8,350 935.24 63.20
1986 12,354 0.98 8,443 926.34 60.07
1987 12,452 0.96 9,934 995.53 56.48
1988 12,854 1.00 10,078 1,057.23 52.80
1989 13,011 1.02 9,761 1,014.19 49.93
1990 13,010 0.98 9,633 971.34 50.31
1991 12,872 0.93 10,104 952.48 49.57
1992 13,140 0.91 10,423 983.36 49.08
1993 13,086 0.89 13,686 1,164.52 48.43
1994 13,278 0.89 16,071 1,437.81 46.45
1995 13,432 0.88 17,554 1,626.74 45.02
1996 13,611 0.88 18,732 1,730.86 48.50
1997 13,866 0.89 19,255 1,789.28 50.97
1998 14,438 0.93 19,627 1,817.12 53.68
1999 14,619 0.98 20,136 1,816.73 51.81
2000 15,066 1.03 20,363 1,797.24 49.59
2001 15,136 1.09 21,614 1,783.82 48.84
2002 15,452 1.17 24,379 1,864.86 49.33
2003 15,655 1.26 27,574 2,047.41 48.76
2004 16,033 1.40 29,574 2,197.85 46.09
2005 16,036 1.56 30,316 2,268.44 42.91
2006 16,447 1.59 30,806 2,280.17 40.01
2007 16,613 1.47 33,877 2,346.54 37.90
aBureau of Economic Analysis (2009), Table 2.1.
bStandard & Poor’s (2009).
cWe assume linear growth during 1976-1987, based on growth rate from 1987 to 1996.
dThe College Board (2009), Table 1.
eThe College Board (2009), Table 1.
fThe College Board (2009), Table 1.
gValues prior to 1996 are discounted by 11% to reflect that these are commitments instead of disbursements, which
are about 11% higher.
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Table B.5: Main dataset (continued)











Unit $ $ One year real
treasury rate
1976 261.77 1,544 0.0012
1977 250.02 1,575 -0.0042
1978 242.84 1,578 0.0075
1979 237.50 1,540 -0.0070
1980 229.10 1,488 -0.0150
1981 219.23 1,510 0.0448
1982 220.18 1,597 0.0611
1983 239.16 1,711 0.0637
1984 270.58 1,813 0.0659
1985 297.32 1,936 0.0486
1986 328.20 2,050 0.0459
1987 355.53 2,099 0.0312
1988 361.93 2,162 0.0351
1989 383.22 2,216 0.0371
1990 444.06 2,240 0.0249
1991 488.42 2,313 0.0165
1992 531.14 2,424 0.0088
1993 581.06 2,541 0.0044
1994 624.11 2,656 0.0276
1995 660.41 2,750 0.0311
1996 689.03 2,837 0.0257
1997 728.09 2,903 0.0334
1998 779.91 2,996 0.0349
1999 825.27 3,077 0.0287
2000 842.39 3,082 0.0275
2001 822.27 3,112 0.0064
2002 801.52 3,238 0.0042
2003 828.43 3,427 -0.0104
2004 872.23 3,634 -0.0077
2005 914.44 3,769 0.0023
2006 955.91 3,892 0.0171
2007 982.15 4,002 0.0168
aThe College Board (2009), Table 1.
bNational Center for Education Statistics (2008), Table 331.
cUS Federal Reserve (2011).
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B.4 Pre-estimation test
The pre-estimation test provides an indication of the value of a particular proxy
variable in predicting enrollment. The quantity metric, enrollment per high school
graduate, is regressed on each proxy variable individually using ordinary least squares
regression. Although coefficients and standard errors are not necessarily correct be-
cause of the clear presence of omitted variable bias, these regressions provide some
additional consistency checks for the final models provided in tables 3.4 and 3.5. We
compare pre-estimation test signs with the signs found in the final models to ensure
consistency.
Signs are generally consistent between the pre-estimation t-tests and the final
models. One exception is financial aid to schools (per student) in the supply model,
which has an insignificant pre-estimation test result (p-value = 0.39) but becomes
significant once we include other relevant variables to eliminate omitted variable bias.
Net tuition (per student) cannot be adequately pre-tested due to the presence of
endogeneity, and because there is omitted variable bias in the pre-estimation model
regressing enrollment on tuition price alone. This pre-estimation model cannot ac-
count for the fact that tuition price should have a different sign in the supply and
the demand model. We also see some sign inconsistencies between the first principal
component of college benefit in the demand model and the pre-tests of the underlying
variables of this principal component. However, since the variables in the principal
component have different signs, and because we do not have a strong theoretical basis
for the “correct” sign of these metrics of the benefit of college, we cannot accurately
compare the principal component sign to the sign of underlying variables.1 A pre-
estimation test of the principal component itself yields the same positive sign we see
1For example, an increase in the percentage of the adult population holding a bachelor’s degree
may make a degree less valuable, as described by Fortin (2006), thus presumably decreasing demand.
On the other hand, prevalence of bachelor’s degrees in a society may make a college education seem
more relevant and increase the perceived importance of education.
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in the final demand model.
Table B.6: Pre-estimation test results (p-values are p-values of coefficients).a,b
Variable name Coefficient sign p-value
Aid to schools per student - 0.3861
Bachelor’s percentage - 0.1833
Disposable income per student - 0.0189
Donations per student - 0.0023
Earnings difference - 0.1674
Endowment distribution per student - 0.0067
Endowment value per student - 0.0001
Grants per student - 0.0166
HEPI + 0.6928
Household debt per student - 0.0016
Student loans per student - 0.0073
Unemployment + 0.0057
aFor detailed variable descriptions, see table 3.1.
bSigns and p-values are the result of regressing enrollment per high school graduate on each
candidate variable individually. These values are used to validate coefficient signs in the final models
in tables 3.4 and 3.5.
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B.5 Preliminary model residual plots
This appendix provides plots of residuals over time for the preliminary models that
make the two-stage least squares adjustment for endogeneity of net tuition price but
do not make the AR(1) autoregressive error term adjustment for heteroskedasticity.
Note the cyclical (non-random) nature of these plots, indicating that heteroskedas-
ticity is present. This is due to the autocorrelated nature of the underlying dataset.
(a) Supply model.a
aThis plot shows the second stage sup-
ply model residuals before the AR(1) adjust-
ment, Y , as seen in equation (3.2).
(b) Demand model.a
aThis plot shows the second stage de-
mand model residuals before the AR(1) ad-
justment, W , as seen in equation (3.3).
Figure B.2: Residuals over time, preliminary models.
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B.6 Comparison of parameter estimates in data subsets
In order to examine robustness of the models in tables 3.4 and 3.5, we construct
models of the same structure using subsets of the data. We estimate separate models
for the period 1976 to 1990 and the period 1991 to 2007. We estimate the autocorre-
lation component separately for each period, and then estimate coefficients for each
variable. We find that effects of some variables change over time, as indicated in
tables B.7 and B.8. These tables also show the result of a set of t-tests examining
whether coefficients change significantly between the two periods. We find that some
significant changes occur, but conclude that the second half of the data (1991 to 2007)
yields results very close to those attained from the full dataset.
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Table B.7: Parameter estimates in data subsets, supply model.a
Two-stage least squares regression
Period 1976 to 1990
b0 (residual autocorrelation) 0.290
Correlation (model estimates vs. actual) 0.602
Variableb Coefficient value St. error p-value
(Intercept) -0.1231 0.0899
Cost of operations (HEPI) -0.0064 0.0504 0.9018
Non-tuition revenue per student -0.7053 0.3258 0.0556
Financial aid to schools per student -0.0004 0.0007 0.5171
Net tuition per student 0.0015 0.0021 0.4946
Period 1991 to 2007
b0 (residual autocorrelation) -0.314
Correlation (model estimates vs. actual) 0.877
Variable Coefficient value St. error p-value
(Intercept) 0.0042 0.0124
Cost of operations (HEPI) 0.0462 0.0113 0.0018
Non-tuition revenue per student -0.2897 0.0534 0.0002
Financial aid to schools per student 0.0001 0.0000 0.0114
Net tuition per student -0.0008 0.0003 0.0279
t-test for coefficient difference, H0: Coefficients for first and second period are the same
p-value Result
Cost of operations (HEPI) 0.0738 Fail to reject H0 at α = .05
Non-tuition revenue per student 0.1177 Fail to reject H0 at α = .05
Financial aid to schools per student 0.0399 Reject H0 at α = .05
Net tuition per student 0.7716 Reject H0 at α = .05
aModel equation is given in equation (3.2), with data split into two time periods.
bFor detailed variable descriptions see tables B.2-B.5.
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Table B.8: Parameter estimates in data subsets, demand model.a
Ordinary least squares regression
Period 1976 to 1990
d0 (residual autocorrelation) 0.460
Correlation (model estimates vs. actual) 0.879
Variableb Coefficient value St. error p-value
(Intercept) -0.0142 0.0258
Benefit of college -0.0786 0.0504 0.1475
Credit effects per student -0.1840 0.0433 0.0014
Net tuition per student -0.0026 0.0018 0.1876
Period 1991 to 2007
d0 (residual autocorrelation) -0.146
Correlation (model estimates vs. actual) 0.553
Variable Coefficient value St. error p-value
(Intercept) -0.0446 0.0160
Benefit of college 0.0243 0.0338 0.4866
Credit effects per student -0.0656 0.0511 0.2233
Net tuition per student 0.0007 0.0008 0.4121
t-test for coefficient difference, H0: Coefficients for first and second period are the same
p-value Result
Benefit of college 0.0000 Reject H0 at α = .05
Credit effects per student 0.0031 Reject H0 α = .05
Net tuition per student 0.1659 Fail to reject H0 at α = .05
aModel equation is given in equation (3.3), with data split into two time periods.
bFor detailed variable descriptions see tables B.2-B.5.
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B.7 Ljung-Box test of residual autocorrelation
Table B.9 provides results of the Ljung-Box test of residual autocorrelation for sup-
ply and demand models with and without the first-order autoregressive error terms.
As we see here, the AR(1) adjustment eliminates autocorrelation from the supply
model. Demand model residuals still exhibit some autocorrelation, but it is reduced
by the AR(1) adjustment.
Table B.9: Ljung-Box test for autocorrelation of residuals, p-values with and without
AR(1) adjustment.a
H0: Residuals uncorrelated at lag 12
Supply model p-values
With AR(1) adjustment 0.301 (fail to reject H0 at α = .05)
Without AR(1) adjustment 0.166 (reject H0 at α = .05)
Demand model p-values
With AR(1) adjustment 0.0001 (reject H0 at α = .05)
Without AR(1) adjustment 1.87x10−6 (reject H0 at α = .05)
aResiduals for models with the AR(1) adjustment are presented in appendix B.1. Residuals for
models without this adjustment are presented in appendix B.5.
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APPENDIX C
Appendices for Chapter IV: An examination of
educational choices, student characteristics, and
ability-adjusted income
C.1 Effect of selectivity of school attended on post-college
income, unconditional and conditional on selectivity of
best school admitted to
Figure C.1 shows average income over the first four years with respect to the
selectivity of the school an individual attended. Income across the whole sample (bar
graph) declines as the selectivity of the school attended declines. This trend becomes
somewhat less obvious after conditioning on the selectivity level of the best school
to which an individual was admitted (lines). The overall downward salary trend in
the unconditional bar graph of figure 4.1a appears stronger than the trend in C.1.
This difference is likely an artifact of the sample used here, but is not surprising
given the fact that the top school attended carries more information that the top
school admitted to. For example, all students who attend a type 1 school must have
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been admitted to at least a type 1 school, meaning we capture a great deal of the
admissions information from data on the school attended.
Figure C.1: Average income over the first four years after expected college graduation
by selectivity of the school attended (bars), with 95% confidence intervals. Lines
indicate income by selectivity of school attended after conditioning on selectivity of
the top school admitted to. Type 1 indicates most selective schools.a,b,c
aExpected college graduation is considered to be four years after the beginning of a college
education for those attending college, and four years after the start of the academic year for which
students applied to college for those not attending.
bSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s selectivity index, which measures the acceptance rate
of students who have applied for study (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are combined into a single
category. Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted.
cSelected sample is presented in table 4.1 and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals included are those from the cross-sectional sample who
completed high school, participated in the college choice section of the survey, were admitted to at
least one four-year institution, and are not missing critical data.
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C.2 Variables necessary for building discrete choice model
Table C.1 provides an overview of candidate variables considered in constructing
the models outlined in this chapter. Source information, descriptions of missing data,
and details about each variable are provided.
Table C.1: Candidate variables used in model construction. Candidate variables are







Barron’s selectivity index for top
admitted school
1 indicates most selective schools, 5/6
indicates least selective. Note that
Barron’s original categories 5 and 6
are combined into type 5/6. Specialty





Barron’s selectivity index of at-
tended school
1 indicates most selective schools, 5/6
indicates least selective. Note that
Barron’s original categories 5 and 6 are
combined into category 5/6. Specialty
schools (7) are excluded. School at-




Graduated Indicates whether individual has
graduated from college by the
current survey date
Latest survey data available are from
2010. Students attending college right
after high school and taking 4 years to
complete a degree would have expected
graduation of 2007.
NLSY 97
β0 Nelson Siegel income curve pa-
rameter
Parameter is a measure of expected
lifetime income. Larger parameters in-
dicate a higher lifetime earnings curve.
Derivation of this parameter is ex-




Gender Student’s gender NLSY 97
Race/
Ethnicity





Grades High school grades Categorical high school grades, with
1 indicating mostly A’s received and
8 indicating mostly failing grades re-
ceived.
NLSY 97
SAT Math Math SAT score Categorical Math SAT score. 1: 200-
300, 2: 301-400, 3: 401-500, 4: 501-
600, 5: 601-700, 6: 701-800, 0: no
score.
NLSY 97
SAT Verbal Verbal SAT score Categorical Verbal SAT score. 1: 200-
300, 2: 301-400, 3: 401-500, 4: 501-
600, 5: 601-700, 6: 701-800, 0: no
score.
NLSY 97
Major Major categories for major at at-
tended school
Possible values are sciences, social sci-
ences, business, engineering, and com-
puters, health, and humanities.
NLSY 97
College year Year first attended college Used to ensure student attends college
within two years of high school gradu-
ation.
NLSY 97
Choice year Year of the college choice (gen-
erally senior year of high school)
Used to ensure IPEDS data from the









Number of years of mother’s for-
mal education
NLSY 97
Household size Number of individuals (includ-
ing student) living in household





Gross annual household income Data point closest in time to the choice
year is used.
NLSY 97









List tuition List out-of-state tuition The advertised out-of-state tuition




Percentage of the student body
receiving student loans.
Indicates whether or not this school





Percentage of students receiving
federal grants.
Serves as an indicator of the wealth of
the student body, since many grants
are specifically for lower-income stu-
dents (Pell grants).
IPEDS
Gender ratio Gender ratio Enrolled males/enrolled females. IPEDS
Total students Number of enrolled full-time stu-
dents.
IPEDS
Control Publicly or privately controlled
institution
IPEDS
Carnegie class Adjusted Carnegie Class of insti-
tution.
Level 1: Research/Ph.D. granting,
2: Other graduate, 3: Bache-
lor’s/liberal arts schools, 4: Specialty
and associates-type degrees.
IPEDS
Selectivity Selectivity from Barron’s selec-
tivity index
Specialty schools (Barron’s index = 7)
are excluded.
Barron’s







IPEDS definition of instructional
spending is used. Total expenses
associated with instructional divisions
of the institution, including compen-
sation of instructors, community and





Faculty per student per full-time
student
IPEDS
Average salary Average salary of full-time fac-
ulty
Proxy for faculty quality and the per-
centage of faculty holding a Ph.D.
IPEDS
Division Athletic division Indicator if whether school is in top









Financial aid Total financial aid received for
the first year of schooling, in-
cluding aid offered specifically
for a particular school, aid of-
fered no matter which school is
attended, and in-state tuition
discounts
Students that claim that they do not
know know financial aid amounts are
treated as receiving zero financial aid,
since it does not factor into the de-
cision. If aid information is missing
in the school choice section, aid from
the school attended section is supple-
mented. This aid amount is adjusted
based on the relationship between re-
ported numbers where they are avail-
able in both sections. Aid from the
schools attended section∗0.445+963.86
yields an estimate of aid reported in
the schools admitted to section (ad-
justed R2 = 0.2522).
NLSY 97
Distance Distance between home and
school zip codes
Students that do not provide a zip
code are located based only on state
data. Zip code data points are trans-
lated into latitude and longitude. For
schools that fail to report zip informa-
tion to IPEDS, latitude and longitude




In-state status Student has in-state residency If no residence state data point is pro-






Match of student residence and
school’s urban/rural characteris-
tics
For schools that do not report
urban/rural information to IPEDS,
schools were researched on their indi-






Selectivity of current candidate
school minus selectivity of top
admitted school of student
Selectivity of school is sometimes miss-
ing in the Barron’s selectivity index of
the correct year, in which case it can is
predicted by 25th and 75th percentile
SAT scores, percentage of applicants
admitted, Carnegie Class, and faculty





C.3 Projecting lifetime income
C.3.1 Functional form of the income curve
Synthetic work-life earnings curves suggest the shape of the income curve over the
lifetime. We experiment with several functional forms that allow us to approximate
this shape. The traditional Mincer model of lifetime earnings calls for a quadratic
age-income profile model for log income:
log(y(t)) = γ0 + γ1t+ γ2t
2 + v (C.1)
where t is age and v gives the (potential) number of years of experience, to allow for
an adjustment for length of schooling. Past literature has shown that this functional
form provides bad fit, requiring at least a fourth order model (Polachek, 2007). As
a replacement for Mincer’s model in this application, we suggest a restricted Nelson-
Siegel curve. The Nelson-Siegel equation allows us to estimate each individual’s life-
time expected earnings profile with only a few data points and provides close fit to
Census synthetic work-life earnings curves for all levels of educational attainment.1
The Nelson-Siegel equation has four parameters, β0, β1, β2, and τ , and the function
is given by:













• β0 (level parameter) gives the long-term level of the function.
• β1 (slope parameter) is found in the second term of the Nelson-Siegel function.
The second term is an exponential decay function. A positive parameter yields
1Plots of these fits by educational attainment are provided in figures C.3 and C.4. More infor-
mation on the fit of these models is provided in section C.3.2.
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a downward slope, a negative parameter an upward slope.
• β2 (curvature parameter) is found in the third term of the Nelson-Siegel func-
tion. The third term is a Laguerre function (product of an exponential and
a polynomial function) that produces the hump (positive parameter) or valley
(negative parameter) in the function. A larger absolute value means the hump
or valley is more pronounced. This parameter gives the rate at which the slope
and curvature parameters decay to zero.
• τ (shape parameter) determines the steepness of the slope factor and the lo-
cation of the maximum or minimum of the Laguerre function (third/curvature
term).
Estimation of the model parameters is done numerically by using nonlinear op-
timization, grid search, Kalman filters and/or state space modeling. However, since
income curves have a fairly common shape across the lifetime of all individuals, we
are able to fix several of the parameters of the Nelson-Siegel curve. This not only
ensures that lifetime income curves have the correct shape, but also reduces data
requirements by limiting the number of parameters we must estimate.
C.3.2 Parameter estimation
We begin by fixing τ so that maximum income is achieved at the correct point
during an individual’s career. In the synthetic work-life income data for people rang-
ing from high school graduates to master’s recipients, this maximum yearly income
occurs at around age 50 (Census Bureau, 2012). We want to determine the value of
τ that forces the maximum value of the third term in equation (C.2) to occur when
t equals the desired value. The third term is the Laguerre function curvature term,
f(t, τ) = 1−e
−t/τ
t/τ
− e−t/τ . Let t∗ be the time at which we would like the maximum to
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t∗ = arg max
t
[f(t, τ ∗)]
Setting τ = τ ∗, equation (C.2) reduces to:
y(τ) = −β0 + β1A(t, τ ∗) + β2B(t, τ ∗) (C.4)
where A(t, τ ∗) = 1−e
−t/τ∗
t/τ∗
and B(t, τ ∗) = 1−e
−t/τ
t/τ
−e−t/τ and A and B can be computed
directly from the age input t and the fixed curvature parameter τ ∗. Parameters β0,
β1, and β2 are estimated using ordinary least squares.




e−t/τ , over time and tau. We determine numerically that a maximum of 50 occurs
when τ = 27.88. With τ fixed, we can achieve close shape fits for the Census synthetic
work-life earnings data, as shown in figure C.3.
Figure C.2: Third (curvature) term in equation (C.2), 1−e
−t/τ
t/τ
− e−t/τ , over τ and age
(t). Value of τ determines where maximum of equation (C.2) occurs.
Since we wish to further reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, we
take advantage of the consistent relationship between the remaining Nelson-Siegel
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Figure C.3: Census synthetic lifetime income earnings curve fits based on equation
(C.2) with fixed τ = τ ∗ only. Dotted lines indicate Nelson-Siegel estimates and solid
lines indicate Census data.a,b
aCensus Bureau (2012).
bτ∗ = 27.88 ensures that lifetime income maximum occurs at the desired age of 50.




are fairly consistent across education groups. We investigate three possible approaches
of parameter reduction and test their ability to fit Census synthetic work-life income
curves. The regression equation fit for each method is provided below.
(a) Setting β1 to equal its average value across high school, some college, associates,
and bachelors degrees.
β1 = 29, 332, y(τ)− β1A = −β0 + β2B
(b) Fixing the relationship between β0 and β2 based on the strong relationship seen
in Census data.
β2 = −mβ0 + b where m = −3.8149 and b = 36, 241, R2 = 0.9967, y(τ)− bB =
−(1 +mB)β0 + β1A
(c) Fixing the relationship between β0 and β2 as above and the relationship between
β0 and β1 based on the strong relationship seen in Census data.
β1 = −nβ0 + a where n = −0.2445 and a = 2, 234.3, R2 = 0.9605, y(τ)− bB −
108
aA = −(1 +mB + nA)β0
The resulting model fits are shown in figure C.4. We determine that method (c) is
able to fit synthetic work-life income curves very closely using only a single parameter,
β0.
2 We project β0 for each individual in our dataset, and thereby attain an estimate
of the future earnings expectations for each student.
C.3.3 Income by educational attainment
Based on the income parameter β0 for each individual, we analyze the differences
in expected lifetime incomes between different attendance and admission selectivity
groups. We find very similar trends to those seen in the raw post-college income
data presented in section 4.5. It is sufficient to examine the value of β0 across groups
since this parameter fully defines future income expectations under the assumptions
of the previous section. Note that we also examine differences in the expected lifetime
earnings implied by β0, with similar results.
3 Unemployment is again not explicitly
modeled in the projected income for future years since we do not have future employ-
ment status information.
As in the analysis of raw post-college income data, we find that both the quality of
the best school admitted to and the school attended to predict the income parameter
β0. However, the predictive ability of the selectivity of school attended is lost if we
control by best school admitted. Table C.2 shows that attendance information that
2Mean squared errors between estimated income and actual Census data for those with high
school degrees, some college, associate’s degrees, and bachelor’s degrees increases only slightly when
parameters are fixed. Mean squared error with only τ fixed is 3, 933, 487 across these groups. Mean
square errors for methods a) through c) in figure C.4 are 4, 600, 744, 4, 845, 014, and 4, 828, 948,
respectively. Income estimates using methods a) and b) were also used to conduct the analysis
described in section C.3.3. Results are similar to those presented here but income projection is
possible for a smaller number of individuals.
3We calculate discounted expected lifetime earnings based on β0 and equation (C.4), assuming
that non-attenders follow the estimated income curve from ages 22 to 100, while attenders follow it
from 18 to 100. Earnings are discounted by a yearly factor of 0.96. The value of the discount factor
is based on estimates found in past literature, for example in Cocco et al. (1998) and Gourinchas
and Parker (1999).
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is uncorrelated with the best school admitted to (“attendance error”) provides no
additional information on income expectations after adjusting for best school admit-
ted to. In contrast, “admission error” remains a significant predictor of income even
after adjusting for the school attended; students that are admitted to top schools
and choose to attend lower caliber institutions exhibit significantly higher earnings
than their classmates. Overall, we do not have sufficient income data to develop a
complete understanding of lifetime income expectations across groups. Therefore, we
are not able to include lifetime income expectations in the choice models presented
in section 4.6. As more data is collected, income projection can be improved and
income expectations included in choice models.
Table C.2: Separating effects of top school admitted to and school attended selectivity
on Nelson-Siegel income parameter using interval selectivity data.
(a) Predicted β0, by selectivity of top
school admitted to and attendance
error. β0 = α0 + α1topAdmit +
α2attendError + ε.
a,b
Ordinary least squares regression
Adjusted R2: 0.0508









aParameter β0 in the restricted Nelson-
Siegel function derived from equation (C.2)
fully determines the lifetime income curve un-
der the assumptions made in section C.3.2.
bSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s
selectivity index (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5
and 6 are combined into a single category.
Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted. In-
terval scale is created be replacing category
label with the percentage of applicants ad-
mitted in each selectivity category. Type 1
schools have admissions rates of at most 33%
while type 5 and 6 schools admit 100% of
their applicants.
(b) Predicted β0, by selectivity of
school attended and admission error.
β0 = α0 + α1attend + α2admitError +
ε.a,b
Ordinary least squares regression
Adjusted R2: 0.0508









aParameter β0 in the restricted Nelson-
Siegel function derived from equation (C.2)
fully determines the lifetime income curve un-
der the assumptions made in section C.3.2.
bSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s
selectivity index (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5
and 6 are combined into a single category.
Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted. In-
terval scale is created be replacing category
label with the percentage of applicants ad-
mitted in each selectivity category. Type 1
schools have admissions rates of at most 33%
while type 5 and 6 schools admit 100% of
their applicants.
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(a) β1 set to its average value across
high school, some college, associates,
and bachelors degrees. β1 = 29, 332,
y(τ) − β1A = −β0 + β2B. Dotted
lines indicate Nelson-Siegel estimates
and solid lines indicate Census data.a,b
aCensus Bureau (2012).
bτ∗ = 27.88 ensures that lifetime income
maximum occurs at the desired age of 50.
(b) Fixed relationship between β0 and
β2 based on trends seen in Census data.
β2 = −mβ0+b where m = −3.8149 and
b = 36, 241, R2 = 0.9967, y(τ) − bB =
−(1 +mB)β0 +β1A. Dotted lines indi-
cate Nelson-Siegel estimates and solid
lines indicate Census data.a,b
aCensus Bureau (2012).
bτ∗ = 27.88 ensures that lifetime income
maximum occurs at the desired age of 50.
(c) Fixed relationship between β0 and
β2 as in (b) and relationship between
β0 and β1 based on trends seen in Cen-
sus data. β1 = −nβ0 + a where n =
−0.2445 and a = 2, 234.3, R2 = 0.9605,
y(τ)− bB − aA = −(1 +mB + nA)β0.
Dotted lines indicate Nelson-Siegel es-
timates and solid lines indicate Census
data.a,b
aCensus Bureau (2012).
bτ∗ = 27.88 ensures that lifetime income
maximum occurs at the desired age of 50.
Figure C.4: Census synthetic lifetime income earnings curve fits based on equation
(C.2) for different estimation procedures.
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C.4 Conditional post-college income effects using categorical
selectivity data
This appendix presents fixed effects models using categorical admission and at-
tendance categories that investigate effects on income after conditioning. School
categories 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5/6 are treated as factor levels instead of converting them
to interval data based on acceptance rates defining these categories. This results in
the need to estimate more parameters, making it difficult to see significant differences
between groups. In table C.3a, we compare post-college income for students in each
attendance category based on their top admitted school. In table C.3b, we compare
post-college income for students in each top admitted category based on the school
they attended. In general, we cannot show that a difference exists between incomes
after conditioning.
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Table C.3: Separating effects of top school admitted to and school attended selectivity
on post-college income, categorical selectivity data.
(a) Predicted post-college income by selectivity of top school admitted to, adjusted by
attended category. β0k = α0k + α1ktopAdmit + εk for each attendance category k.
a
Fixed effects regression







(Intercept) 2 3 4 5/6
none 257 1,2,3,4,5 18,273 4,150 1,106 -4,958 792
1 39 NA NA NA NA NA NA
2 77 1,2 24,915 (*)c 8,691 NA NA NA
3 226 1,2,3 22,698 (*) 7,869 1,431 NA NA
4 333 1,2,3,4 32,192 (*) -5,576 (.)d -9,187 (*) -6,115 NA
5/6 121 2,3,4,5 27,152 (*) -859 -5,795 -7,426 NA
aSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s selectivity index, which measures the acceptance rate
of students who have applied for study (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are combined into a single
category. Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted.
bCoefficients are relative to baseline. Baseline is top admitted school of type 1 except for atten-
dance category 5/6; in attendance category 5/6/, base case is top admitted school of type 2.
c* indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
d. indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
(b) Predicted post-college income by selectivity of school attended, adjusted by top ad-
mitted category. β0k = α0k + α1kattend + εk for each top admitted category k.
a
Fixed effects regression









1 2 3 4 5/6
1 121 none,









2, 3, 4, 5












NA NA NA 8,298
(*)
3,579
5,6 125 none, 5 19,065
(*)
NA NA NA NA 661
aSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s selectivity index, which measures the acceptance rate
of students who have applied for study (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are combined into a single
category. Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted.
bCoefficients are relative to baseline. Baseline is attending no school at all.
c* indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
d. indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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C.5 Effect of attending college at all
Table C.4 examines the effect of the decision to attend college at all on post-college
income for each top admitted category. Results indicate that attending college at all
may have a positive effect on post-college income for all top admission categories, espe-
cially for those admitted to higher caliber schools. Further analysis reveals that there
is no difference in the expected salary coefficient for students who choose not to at-
tend school at all between different top admitted categories. The average post-college
annual salary for non-attenders is $18, 798. For college attenders, salary differences do
exist between different top admitted groups. These differences are explained further
in figure 4.2.
Table C.4: Effect of binary decision to attend college on post-college income.a,b
Summary of fixed effects models by top admitted category
Top admitted # in category Coefficients p-values
Non-attendersc Attenders Non-attenders Attenders
1 121 18,273 29,688 0.0015 0.0607
2 155 22,423 30,800 1.31x10−05 0.1170
3 297 19,379 23,980 3.99x10−19 0.0433
4 355 17,778 25,599 3.38x10−25 4.77x10−5
5,6 125 19,065 19,726 1.66x10−17 0.7937
aSelectivity scores are based on Barron’s selectivity index, which measures the acceptance rate
of students who have applied for study (Barron’s, 2009). Types 5 and 6 are combined into a single
category. Specialty schools (type 7) are omitted.
bSelected sample is presented in table 4.1 and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals included are those from the cross-sectional sample who
completed high school, participated in the college choice section of the survey, were admitted to at
least one four-year institution, and are not missing critical data.
cNon-attenders are the base case in this regression.
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C.6 Logistic choice models
In a discrete choice framework, we model a decision-maker that makes a choice
or set of choices over a set of alternatives. For a decision-maker i, we would like to
understand what causes him or her to select a particular alternative, j. The choice
is based on a set of observable factors, x, as well as a set of unobservable factors,
ε. These inputs fully determine the agent’s choice by defining the utility of each
alternative to person i, written as Ui,j. To simplify this model, we assume that the
non-random component of utility is linear in parameters, allowing us to write down
the utility function as follows:
Ui,j = δ
′xi,j + εi,j (C.5)
where δ is the vector of parameters to be estimated and x is the vector of input
characteristics of the decision maker i, the choice j, and interaction terms between i
and j. To estimate parameters of the model, we analyze the probability of a given
choice j being made when a certain set of observable factors x is present. Let us define
an indicator function that indicates the outcomes of ε for which j is the optimal choice.
Let h(x, ε) be the behavioral process that fully determines the agent’s choice given x
and the realization of ε. The indicator function can be written as:
I[h(x, ε) = j] =
 1 if h(x, ε) = j,0 otherwise (C.6)
We then examine all possible realizations of ε for which j is the choice outcome:
P (j|x) = P (ε s.t. h(x, ε) = j). We can formulate P (j|x) as an integral over the
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possible realizations of ε:
P (j|x) = P (I[h(x, ε) = j] = 1) (C.7)
=
∫
I[h(x, ε) = j]f(ε)dε
The integral in equation (C.7) can be expressed in closed form only in a few cases.
One such case is when the components of ε are distributed according to i.i.d. type 1
extreme value distributions, making the choice model a logistic choice model (see e.g.
McFadden (1974)). When we have this type of distribution for ε in equation (C.5),
we can write the probability of selecting a particular choice j only in terms of the







Logistic choice models have several useful characteristics for this application.
Firstly, the logistic models exhibits what is called the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) property. This means that preferences between alternatives do not
change as the choice set changes. For any two alternatives a and b, the ratio of their
















The IIA property is useful for this application since the choice set available to students
depends on a previous decision, namely where to apply for school. The schools a
student did not apply to may shift the utility of the schools to which they did apply.
However, due to the IIA property the relative probability of attending one school over
another remains constant. This allows us to model choice between colleges even when
we are unsure that every possible school considered by the student is provided in the
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NLSY 97 dataset.
A second critical advantage of the logistic choice model is that we can create
a choice model focused entirely on the characteristics of the alternatives, called a
conditional choice model. A conditional choice model is used in the second stage of
our model. Since every student’s choice set is unique and may include schools that
do not appear anywhere else in the sample, we define schools solely based on their
individual characteristics, such as tuition price, school size, and metrics of school
quality. The alternative-based conditional logit model, described further in section
4.6.2, allows us to do exactly this.
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C.7 Comparison to models in Long (2004b)
The models presented in this chapter closely follow the structure developed in
Long (2004b). Our models are generally consistent with Long’s previous findings,
but results differ due to the use of different datasets. The dataset used in this chap-
ter is much smaller than Long’s, but contains richer data on individual qualities,
school characteristics, and income over time. Additionally, the current work focuses
exclusively on four-year schools, while Long includes two-year institutions. Tables
C.5 and C.6 presents Long’s original models as well as recreations of these models
using our data. Signs are consistent, with the exception of distance from the student’s
home to the school. We find a very small positive effect from distance when replicat-
ing Long’s model, but distance is not significant in other model configurations. Our
selectivity difference metric implies that students choose to attend more selective in-
stitutions relative to their own performance. This is the same directional preference
indicated by Long’s SAT percentile variables, which indicate that students prefer col-
leges whose SAT percentiles are higher than their own. Model fit is slightly better in
the current model than in Long’s for the first stage, while Long’s fit is better in the
second stage model. We use average faculty salary as a proxy for the percentage of
faculty with a PhD, and selectivity difference between the school in question and top
admitted school as a proxy for SAT performance relative to the student body. The
comparison models from Long’s work used here are those for the 1992 cohort. Note
that coefficients in Long’s original work are presented as odds ratios (eβ) but have
been adjusted here for consistency with the rest of the chapter.
118
Table C.5: Comparison model for first stage logit regression model of decision to
attend college at all.










County unemployment rateb 0.0173
a. indicates significance at the 0.10
level.
bCounty unemployment rate is not
readily available for NLSY 97 data and
is omitted from the comparison model.
(b) First stage model to replicate Long




Tuition price (aid adjusted)b -5.37x10−6





aSelected sample is presented in table 4.1 and
is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individuals included
are those from the cross-sectional sample who
completed high school, participated in the college
choice section of the survey, were admitted to at
least one four-year institution, and are not missing
critical data.
bThis is list tuition-financial aid, where finan-
cial aid includes in-state discounts, aid awarded
by the individual school, and aid awarded for use
at all schools.
c. indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
d* indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
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Table C.6: Comparison model for second stage conditional logit regression model of
choice between candidate schools.








(Tuition price)2 0.0146 (*)b
Distance -1.3213 (*)
(Distance)2 8.15x10−2 (*)
Instructional expenditures 9.85x10−2 (*)
(Instructional expenditures)2 -2.10x10−3 (*)
Student/faculty ratio 1.26x10−2
% faculty with Ph.D.s 5.98x10−3 (*)
Student SAT %ile larger
than school’s
-0.3384 (*)
Student SAT %ile smaller
than school’s
0.1663 (*)
2-year college dummy 1.580 (*)
aThis is list tuition-financial aid, where fi-
nancial aid includes in-state discounts, aid
awarded by the individual school, and aid
awarded for use at all schools.
b* indicates significance at the 0.05 level.





Tuition price (aid adjusted) -5.91x10−5 (*)b





Average faculty salaryc 9.35x10−6
Selectivity differenced -1.17x10−2 (.)e
aSelected sample is presented in table 4.1
and is derived from NLSY 1997 respondents
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Individu-
als included are those from the cross-sectional
sample who completed high school, partici-
pated in the college choice section of the sur-
vey, were admitted to at least one four-year
institution, and are not missing critical data.
b* indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
cAverage faculty salary is used as a proxy
for faculty quality, similar to Long (2004b)’s
use of % faculty with Ph.D.s.
dSelectivity difference is the difference in
Barron’s selectivity index between the top
school admitted to for the current student
and the selectivity of the school in question
(selectivity of this school minus selectivity of
top school admitted to). This is a proxy for
ability fit of the student, similar to the SAT
percentiles used in Long (2004b).
e. indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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C.8 Collinearity and model selection
As part of the model selection process, we determine which variables are highly
correlated in order to eliminate collinearity from our models. We use correlation and
condition numbers to identify problem areas, and create a robust model selection
process that tests all permutations of variables in highly collinear categories. Table
C.7 provides an overview of the approach used.
Table C.7: Overview of model selection process.a
Category Description of variables
A Tuition/aid
Net tuition*b
List out of state tuition and financial aid amount
List out of state tuition, financial aid amount without the
instate discount, and instate discount amount
B Selectivity
Interval-measured selectivity of school in question
Interval-measured difference between top admitted and school
in question selectivity*
C Expenditures/wealth






Principal component of quality variables: total students,
graduation rate, percentage receiving federal grants, average
faculty salary, and selectivityc
aCategories of highly related variables tested in model selection for second stage model (choice
between schools).
b* indicates configuration used in final model.
cWhile the principal component approach yields slightly better model fits, graduation rate is
used in final models for the sake of easy interpretation.
Note that we also test for linear separation of each predictor variable to ensure
reasonable model results. Outliers are found in some cases. For example, an all male
college adds an extreme data point to the gender ratio variable. In this and similar
cases, we carefully investigate data for accuracy and ensure that inclusion/exclusion
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